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ABSTRACT
First generation cyberlaw scholars were deeply influenced by
the uniqueness of cyberspace, and believed its technology and scope
meant it could not be controlled by any government. Few still ascribe
to this utopian vision. However, there is now a growing body of second
generation cyberlaw scholarship that speaks not only to the differential
character of cyberspace, but also analyzes legal norms within virtual
spaces while drawing connections to our experience in real space. I
call this the New Virtualism. Situated within this emerging scholarship,
this Article offers a new approach to privacy in cyberspace by drawing
on what Orin Kerr calls the internalist or virtualist perspective. The
virtualist approach to privacy in cyberspace shifts the focus away from
the concept of privacy itself which has been over-theorized and over-
categorized by privacy theorists, to analyzing and theorizing persons
in cyberspace and how they ought to be understood. It focuses on
virtual persons and the distinct privacy concerns they raise, and
reconnects ideas about informational and data privacy to traditional
normative justifications for privacy based on personhood. Adopting a
virtualist approach to privacy in cyberspace has conceptual,
normative, constitutional, and public policy benefits.
Recently a postgraduate researcher at the Faculty of Law, Oxford University, where
he was a Mackenzie King Travelling Scholar. The author would like to thank the
staff of the Oxford Internet Institute for their patience and assistance in the course
of this research and YJoLT editor Caitlin Hall for her help in preparing the article
for publication. He would also like to thank Robert Danay, Jonathan Zittrain,
Richard Albert, Ali Abrar,, Julie Cohen, and Kandia Aird for their advice,
comments and/or suggestions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, John
Perry Barlow famously pronounced the existence of a new frontier
called "cyberspace," a world altogether distinct from real space. From
this premise of difference and electronic independence, Barlow
concluded that cyberspace would remain "immune" from the
"sovereignty" of traditional governments.' The simplicity and
revolutionary character of these ideas was appealing-so appealing
that many early "cyberlaw" scholars 2 followed Barlow to argue that
traditional laws ought not apply to the virtual worlds of cyberspace,
that they be left alone to formulate their own legal rules and norms.
Many have since questioned the "cyberutopian vision" of
cyberspace as existing beyond the reach of traditional laws and forms
4
of governance. Recently, John L. Goldsmith and Tim Wu offered a
sound debunking of Barlow's claim, demonstrating that traditional
governments do, in many ways, control cyberspace. 5 The strength of
their arguments led Orin Kerr to remark that few still take the
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8,
1996), reprinted in CRYPTO ANARCHY, CYBERSTATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS 27, 28
(Peter Ludlow ed., 2001), available at http://www.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-
Final.html.
2 See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REv. 501 (1999).
3 See, e.g, 1. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT.
L. REv. 993, 994, 1019-25 (1994) (advocating self-help, custom, and contract to
regulate cyberspace); David R. Johnson & David G Post, Law and Borders: The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367-75 (1996) [hereinafter
Johnson & Post, Law and Borders] (noting possibilities of internal regulation of
Internet through competing rule sets); David R. Johnson & David G Post, And
How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of
Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62, 65 (Brian
Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997) [hereinafter Johnson & Post, Meditation]
(arguing for a decentralized system of Internet governance); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?,
12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 419-20 (1997) (contending that as a general rule
"self-governance is desirable for electronic communities"); David G Post,
Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 161 (1996) (arguing for metaphor
of cyberspace as separate space); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and
Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 912-917 (1996) [hereinafter
Reidenberg, Governing] (arguing that attempts to define rules for the development
of cyberspace rely on disintegrating concepts of territory and sector, and ignore the
new borders that transcend national boundaries); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex
Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology,
76 TEx. L. REv. 553 (1998) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Lex Informatica] (arguing for
a "Lex Informatica" which would regulate cyberspace through technological
devices).
4 Orin S. Kerr, Enforcing Law Online, 74 U. CHi. L. REv. 745, 745 (2007).
5 See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006); Kerr, supra note 5, at 751-52.
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cyberutopians "seriously,"'6 and to the extent that such views do remain
influential, Goldsmith and Wu have offered a decisive rebuke.
It is now common to speak of first and second generation
cyberlaw scholarship. The first generation cyberlaw scholars, deeply
influenced by Barlow and the cyberutopians, were wrong about how
"free" the internet and cyberspace would be from the arm of the state.
But this does not mean we should completely discard all ideas in this
early body of scholarship, nor the Declaration itself. It spoke to much
more than a thesis about limited government; it spoke first and
foremost to the differential character of cyberspace and its virtual
worlds. Entering cyberspace meant entering someplace different,
inhabited not by real people, but our "virtual selves." 8 As Lawrence
Lessig has persuasively shown, there is something different about
cyberspace and virtual worlds, and the laws and norms that govern
them. 9 Early scholars who wrote of cyberspace as a separate world
beyond real space have been aptly called the "virtualists" by James
Grimmelmann.' 0 So while Barlow and early virtualists were wrong
about the independence of cyberspace, they did offer an important
perspective about the uniqueness of cyberspace and how it might
impact cyberlaw problems.
Building upon these earlier ideas, a new body of virtualist
scholarship is emerging." I call this the New Virtualism. The
difference between this scholarship, and what Jack Balkin calls "first
generation" cyberlaw scholarship, 12 is that the New Virtualism, while
exploring the legal and technological implications of cyberspace and
virtual worlds as places distinct from real space, forgoes the
cyberutopian dream that cyberspace can or will be a self-governing
domain, independent of the laws of territorial governments. 13 Instead,
the New Virtualism consciously negotiates the "borders" between
cyber and real space, drawing parallels and connections in order to
better understand how law can and should work in virtual landscapes.
The New Virtualism also confronts what Orin Kerr calls the
problem of "internal" and "external," or real and virtual, perspectives
6 Kerr, supra note 5, at 751.
7 E.g LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at xiv-xv (2006); Jack Balkin, Virtual
Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV.
2043, 2044 n.3 (2004); Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Regulation
Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to "Private"
Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1263, 1264-65 (2000).
8 Barlow, supra note 2.
9 LESSIG, supra note 8.
10 James Grimmelmann, Virtual Borders: The Interdependence of Real and Virtual
Worlds, FIRST MONDAY (Feb. 6, 2006),
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue 11 2/grimmelmann/index.html.
11 See infra note 36.
12 Balkin, supra note 7, at 2044 n.3
13 Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3.
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of cyberlaw, 14 but unlike original virtualism, it does not view them in
all-or-nothing fashion. An internal or "virtualist" perspective means
approaching cyberlaw problems from the perspective of a person
internal to the virtual world or reality created in the "world of
cyberspace."' 15 That is, it approaches the person as someone inhabiting
virtual worlds, not in physical form, but as an identity that is
negotiating the virtual terrain of cyberspace. The external or real
perspective approaches the "internet user" as simply someone sitting at
a computer, very much in the real world and its real space. 16 The
original virtualists embraced the "internal" or virtual perspective,
claiming that the distinctive character of cyberspace rendered
traditional laws-those conceived in real space from an external
perspective-irrelevant.
In contrast, the New Virtualism understands that the borders
between cyberspace and real space are not clearly defined. 17 They are
porous, flexible, fluid, and shifting. Thus, it explores legal questions
from an internal perspective, but recognizes that, in some instances, an
external perspective is warranted to fully understand the law and how
it ought to work in cyberspace. The New Virtualism, like its
forebearer, heralds the uniqueness and importance of cyberspace and
virtual worlds, but rather than ignoring the impact of realism and the
laws of real space, draws them into the analysis, offering a deeper level
of analysis for cyberlaw's deepest questions.
This Article attempts to bring this approach to the concepts of
privacy and personhood in cyberspace. My argument is simple. The
present predominant approach to privacy in cyberspace-based mainly
on the concept of information privacy-has failed to make headway
against privacy threats because it has relied too heavily on an implicit
realist or external perspective. Information privacy conceives of the
person sitting at their computer, external to cyberspace, with
information about them collected, moved, stored, and existing in
remote places, be it electronic databases, computers, or other private
actors or electronic media in networks. Questions and issues about the
identity of the person in cyberspace and how this personal information
relates to their "self' in cyberspace are completely precluded by the
idea of information privacy. Since information privacy conceives of
information cut off from the person, it fails to account for the
important ways privacy in this information affects personhood in
cyberspace, our liberty and ability to achieve self-determination in
virtual worlds.
Instead, we must ask different questions. The virtualist
approach to privacy in cyberspace shifts the focus the away from the
concept of privacy itself, which has been over-theorized and over-
14 Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357-405
(2003).
15 Id. at 357.
16 id.
17 See Balkin, supra note 7, at 2060.
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categorized by privacy theorists, to analyzing and theorizing persons in
cyberspace and how they ought to be understood. It focuses on virtual
persons and their privacy interests and issues, and reconnects ideas
about informational and data privacy to more fundamental normative
justifications for privacy based on personhood. I set out these ideas in
Part IV (after a survey of the present state of privacy scholarship in
Part III) and argue, among other things, that data information is
constitutive of personhood in cyberspace in a much more fundamental
way than in real space. That is, unlike privacy in the real world, where
we have physical bodies separate from the information recorded about
us, personhood in cyberspace is more intimately connected to this
information. If privacy sets out to protect the interests of the virtual
person in cyberspace, then privacy in this data and information
becomes essential. To be clear, I do not suggest that virtual persons are
somehow removed from our actual selves in real space, and thus have
independent privacy interests. Rather, our "virtual person" is an
important extension of our own person and identity, with implications
for intimacy and dignity. Virtualist privacy offers the best means to
address these issues.
Part V outlines the advantages of a virtualist approach to
privacy in cyberspace. The first is conceptual and normative. It
clarifies that informational privacy is not a separate subset of privacy,
but a manifestation of traditional understanding of privacy tied to
personhood. Privacy ought not be further complicated, but simply
understood from a virtualist perspective in cyberspace. This, I will
argue, simplifies the concept of privacy and its taxonomy while
reconnecting privacy in cyberspace to stronger normative justifications
relating to personhood. The second advantage is constitutional. I will
argue that a virtualist approach offers a new basis to found a broader
constitutional right, or constitutional commitment, to informational
privacy in cyberspace. A constitutional commitment to informational
privacy is important not only for traditional reasons-to protect people
from government-but also offers a normative framework to
encourage both state and non-state actors to take more proactive
measures to protect privacy.
The third advantage relates to public policy and code. I respond
to skeptics to suggest that recognition of a clear constitutional
commitment to broad informational privacy protection in cyberspace
would be irrelevant as many privacy threats originate from private
actors. I argue that a constitutional commitment imposes additional
responsibilities on both state and private actors and can help foster a
constitutional culture of privacy necessary for robust privacy
protection now and in the future. Moving beyond constitutional
arguments, I suggest that virtualist privacy, which speaks to
experiences of living and learning in virtual worlds, can help influence
the next generation of programmers who will be responsible for
shaping the future of cyberspace and the values hardwired into its
code. This generation will have experienced and lived virtual worlds in
greater depth than any before it, and our thinking on things like privacy
6
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and other important values needs to keep up. The virtualist perspective
is part of this shift in ideas.
II. THE NEW VIRTUALISM: A BRIEF HISTORY
A. THE ORIGINAL VIRTUALISTS
The original virtualists had a clearly defined project for
cyberspace. These "first generation" cyberlaw scholars urged
lawmakers to leave cyberspace alone and let it "produce its own rule
sets" to govern itself.'8 This idea echoed those of the early
"cyberutopians"' 9 like John Perry Barlow and Julian Dibbell, who
heralded the liberating properties of cyberspace and virtual reality.
20
The techno-libertarian philosophy of Barlow and Dibbell, with its
unwavering promotion of the ideals of liberty and free speech, was a
philosophy shared by the many programmers and developers who
helped found and shape the Internet-and thus cyberspace itself-in its
early years.2' So when governments began paying more attention to
activities in cyberspace, an important question was posed: Who would
be responsible for regulating cyberspace? The answer from Barlow and
Dibbell was clear. Governments had no role to play. Cyberspace
existed beyond the reach of the state, as a place without jurisdictional
borders or national laws. Traditional governments would "have no
sovereignty.
2 2
Early cyberlaw scholars, whom we might also call the original
virtualists, would answer this question similarly. They too believed
there was something "uniquely valuable" about virtual worlds and
cyberspace, something "worth nurturing., 23 But rather than offer a
radical libertarian philosophy in the vein of Barlow and Dibbell, the
I Id. at 2044 n.3 ("[T]he first generation of cyberlaw scholarship ... urged courts
and legislatures to treat the Internet as a separate space or series of spaces that
could produce its own rule sets.").
19 1 borrow "cyberutopian" from Orin Kerr, supra note 4, at 751. Fred Turner uses the
term "techno-utopians." FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE TO
CYBERCULTURE: STEWART BRAND, THE WHOLE EARTH NETWORK, AND THE RISE
OF DIGITAL UTOPIANISM 261 (2006).
20 See Barlow, supra note 1; see also Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace: How an
Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned
a Database Into a Society, VILLAGE VOICE 38 (Dec. 21, 1993) (describing how a
virtual Internet community reacted to an unruly participant by creating a self-
governance scheme).
21 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & Wu, supra note 5, at 10, 13, 24-25 (writing that Dibbell
and Barlow created "a new frontier, where people lived in peace, under their own
rules, liberated from the constraints of an oppressive society and free from
government meddling" and that this vision was shared by other pioneers of
cyberspace who believed "the Internet might transcend territorial law and render
the nation-state obsolete"); see also TURNER, supra note 19, at 261 (writing that
the "techno-utopians" had "conjured up visions of a disembodied, peer-to-peer
utopia ... a return to a more natural, more intimate state of being").
22 Barlow, supra note 1.
23 Grimmelmann, supra note 10.
2007-2009
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original virtualists formulated creative cyberlaw solutions for how
virtual communities and worlds might govern themselves, often
incorporating technological as well as legal proposals.24 A classic
statement of original virtualism is the seminal article "Law and
Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace" 25 published in the
Stanford Law Review by David Johnson and David Post in 1996.
Johnson and Post heralded the "special character" of cyberspace, and
advocated that traditional laws should not apply to it, or in the least,
26
ought to have limited application. As an alternative to the territorial
laws of the state, Johnson and Post offered rule sets based on
27
community consensus.
The original virtualists also took sides. Because they believed
in the special character of cyberspace, and theorized it as a separate
place, they fully embraced the "internal" or virtualist perspective. The
external or realist perspective was something inextricably tied to the
laws and systems of control exercised by territorial governments, and
the old ways of thinking about law and virtual worlds. That type of
thinking had to be discarded in order to ensure that the new laws that
would govern cyberspace and virtual worlds would take into account
the "special characteristics" of these cyberspaces, and the "persons,
places, and things found there., 28 Those people local to cyberspaces,
that is, those living within these virtual communities, would have the
best ideas about how to regulate them.
B. FROM THE OLD TO NEW
As Internet use and cyberspace continued to migrate toward
mainstream popular culture in the late 1990s, two important things
became clear. First, cyberspace was not as independent as the
virtualists and cyberutopians had hoped. Cyberspace could not
guarantee liberty and freedom. Rather, these ideals depended upon
24 See Hardy, supra note 3, at 1019-25 (advocating self-help, custom, and contract to
regulate cyberspace); Johnson & Post, Meditation, supra note 3 (arguing for a
decentralized system of Internet governance); Johnson & Post, Law and Borders,
supra note 3, at 1367-75 (noting possibilities of internal regulation of the Internet
through competing rule sets); Perritt, supra note 3, at 419-20 (contending that as a
general rule "self-governance is desirable for electronic communities"); Post,
supra note 3, at 161 (arguing for metaphor of cyberspace as separate space);
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, supra note 4 (arguing for a "Lex Informatica" which
would regulate cyberspace through technological devices); Edward J. Valauskas,
Lex Netivorkia: Understanding the Internet Community, FIRST MONDAY (Oct. 7,
1996), http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4/valauskas/index.html (calling for
formalization of Internet self-governance).
25 Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 3.
26 Id. at 1400-01 (writing that the "new law" created in cyberspace be treated as a
"distinct doctrine, applicable to a clearly demarcated sphere, created primarily by
legitimate, self-regulatory processes, and entitled to appropriate deference").
27 See id at 1401.
28 Id.; see also Reidenberg, Governing, supra note 3 (arguing that attempts to define
rules for the development of cyberspace rely on disintegrating concepts of territory
and sector, and ignore the new borders that transcend national boundaries).
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code and design. Lawrence Lessig popularized these ideas with his
influential pun "code is law.",29 Like law, code reflects certain values,
but there is nothing inherent in code that secures freedom or liberty.
The liberty and autonomy that seemed so "fundamental" and unique to
cyberspace really were not fundamental at all.3° Second, the borders
between cyberspace and real space were not as clearly defined as the
original virtualists presumed. 3' Increased commodification was slowly
eroding the seeming immutable borders of the virtual and real. 2
Moreover, despite the predictions of the cyberutopians, traditional
territorial governments had become important players in Internet
governance. 3 The external arm of the state could reach into the virtual
realm of cyberspace after all. Ten years after the publication of "Law
and Borders," Johnson and Post remarked that while in some ways the
boundaries between real space and cyberspace are clearer, in others
they are "becoming more and more permeable each day.",
34
These developments showed that the first generation cyberlaw
scholars had missed the mark. Things were more complicated than
they had assumed. But this did not mean that the skeptics of cyberlaw
were right, that cyberlaw had nothing original to say. 5 A more flexible
approach to these sorts of cyberlaw questions was required, but the
interesting legal, theoretical, and normative issues in cyberlaw, like the
question of perspective discussed above, would not go away. They
deserved further exploration.
Today, a new body of cyberlaw scholarship is emerging to take
up this challenge. This body of work I have called the New Virtualism.
The scholarship is still virtualist in that like the earlier scholarship, it
often analyzes cyberlaw issues from an internal or virtualist
perspective. But this work is "new" in that it differs in important ways
from original virtualism. First, the New Virtualism, like the original,
heralds the uniquess of cyberspace and virtual worlds, but offers a
29 LESSIG, supra note 7, at 5.
30 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) ("Values that
we now consider fundamental will not necessarily remain. Freedoms that were
foundational will slowly disappear.").
31 See TURNER, supra note 19, at 260-61 (writing that the "rhetoric" of the utopians
neglected the important material and technological connections between the
Internet and the real world).
32 See Balkin, supra note 7, at 2059 (arguing that real-world commodification is
causing the breakdown between game spaces and real space).
33 See generally GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 5.
34 David Johnson & David Post, The Great Debate: Law in the Virtual World, FIRST
MONDAY (Feb. 6, 2006),
http://www.firstmonday. org/issues/issue 112/post/index.html.
35 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI.
LEGAL. F. 207, 208 (1996) (arguing that cyberlaw is simply law involving
technology); Christopher M. Kelly, The Cyberspace Separatism Fallacy, 34 TEX.
INT'L. L.J. 413, 418 (1999) (making a similar argument in conclusion); Joseph H.
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more flexible and fluid approach. Drawing insight from developments
since the early 1990s, rather than proclaiming or advocating the
independence of cyberspace, the New Virtualism explores how real
and virtual worlds interact, drawing connections, analogies, and
parallels between real and virtual spaces. 6 The realization that the
borders between real space and cyberspace are not clearly drawn does
not mean cyberlaw writers must fall silent. Rather, this reality raises
new, interesting questions about how law works, or ought to work, in
virtual spaces. Jack Balkin's work on "virtual liberty 37 and James
Grimmelmann's exploration of the "interdependence" of real and
virtual worlds38 and comparative virtualism, 39 are good examples of
such inquiries.
36 See James Grimmelmann, Virtual Power Politics, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW,
GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS (Jack M. Balkin & Beth S. Noveck eds., 2006)
(exploring software design through lens of virtual world politics); Balkin, supra
note 7 (discussing "virtual liberty" in virtual worlds and the boundaries between
cyberspace and real space); see also Richard H. Bartle, Why Governments Aren't
Gods and Gods Aren't Governments, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 2006),
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/specialll 9/bartle/ (calling for formalization of
Internet self-governance); Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the
Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 19 (2005); Edward Castronova,
The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185, 185, 209-10 (2005) (writing that
virtual worlds "represent a new technology" allowing "deeper and richer access to
the mental states" and exploring how a "right to play" can be preserved in the face
of real world concerns and the hierarchies of "ordinary human affairs");
Grimmelmann, supra note 10 (comparing virtualist and realist perspectives in
cyberlaw and emphasizing the importance of recognizing the interconnectedness
of both, to preserve the distinctiveness of cyberspaces); James Grimmelmann,
Virtual Worlds as Comparative Law, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 147 (2004)
[hereinafter Grimmelmann, Virtual Worlds] (approaching the law within virtual
worlds as comparative legal study); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the
Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REv. 439 (2003) (arguing that the
metaphor of cyberspace legitimizes the imposition of private property-like regimes
on virtual spaces, precluding their common use and enjoyment); Kerr, supra note
14 (exploring the "problem of perspective" in cyberlaw); F. Gregory Lastowka &
Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual World, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter
Lastowka & Hunter, Virtual World] (arguing that items in virtual worlds ought to
have property protection as much as items in non-virtual worlds); F. Gregory
Lastowka & Dan Hunter, irtual Crimes, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv 293 (2004)
(exploring whether destruction of virtual property can or ought to be conceived as
criminal activity); Beth Noveck, The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (2004)
(discussing questions raised by virtual worlds for real world laws); Tal Zarsky,
Information Privacy in Virtual Worlds: Identifying Unique Concerns Beyond the
Online and Offline Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 231 (2004) (discussing possible
questions raised by virtual worlds for real world laws); Edward Castronova,
Theory of the Avatar (CESifo Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 863,
2003) (exploring human activity in virtual worlds through bodily representation in
avatar form); Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies (CESifo Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 752, 2002) [hereinafter Castronova, Virtual Economies]
(exploring the growth of virtual economies and the impact on real world
economies); Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market
and Society on the Cyberian Frontier (CESifo Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 618, 2001) (conducting an economic analysis of Sony's EverQuest
virtual world called "Norrath").
'7 Balkin, supra note 7.
38 Grimmelmann, supra note 10 (comparing virtualist and realist perspectives in
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Morever, the New Virtualism offers a less hierarchical
understanding of perspective in cyberlaw issues. The original
virtualists implicitly privileged the internal perspective by exploring
legal issues, norms and concepts from a viewpoint within cyberspace,
while minimizing the importance or relevance of the external
perspective. This is not a surprising revelation. The early cyberlaw
scholars were grappling with difficult questions of law and technology,
and it made sense to approach these questions from within the
cyberspaces they were analyzing. The New Virtualism, however, while
still focusing primarily on the internal or virtualist perspective, does
not dismiss externalism, but brings real space concerns into the
analysis. Tal Zarsky's recent work on informational privacy in "online
and offline worlds",40 and Edward Castronova's analysis of "virtual
economies, ' 41 are examples of work that weave this balance.
Finally, the New Virtualism has embarked on a rich exploration
of law in virtual worlds, often incorporating-or, using Lessig's term,
"translating" 42 -real-world legal concepts into the cyber realm. Recent
scholarship on the laws of gaming and virtual worlds43 and the
groundbreaking work by F. Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter on
virtual property, are notable here.
I want to situate this Article within this new and still-emerging
body of scholarship. As noted, the New Virtualism approaches
perspective in cyberlaw in a more flexible way than early cyberlaw
scholarship. But moreover, I believe it is possible to transform what
Orin Kerr calls the "problem of perspective" 44 in cyberlaw into a
powerful analytical tool. Legal scholars have often failed to recognize
the distinction between real and virtual perspectives, leading to
confusion and problematic methodology.45 The result is an implicit
privileging of a point of view, often the external or realist one. This is
not surprising. Most legal scholarship has historically been realist.
cyberlaw and emphasizing the importance of recognizing the interconnectedness
of both, to preserve the distinctiveness of cyberspaces).
39 Grimmelmann, Virtual Worlds, supra note 36 (approaching the law within virtual
worlds as comparative legal study).
40 Zarsky, supra note 36 (discussing possible questions raised by virtual worlds for
real world laws).
41 Castronova, Virtual Economies, supra note 36 (exploring the growth of virtual
economies and the impact on real-world economies).
42 Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMoRY L.J. 869, 874
(1996) (arguing that "translation" of constitutional values is the best way to
achieve fidelity to the Constitution in cyberspace).
43 See, e.g., Castronova, Right to Play, supra note 36, at 208-09 (exploring how a
"right to play" can be preserved in the face of real world concerns and the
hierarchies of "ordinary human affairs"); Grimmelmann, Virtual Worlds, supra
note 36 (exploring software design through lens of virtual world politics); Noveck,
supra note 36 (discussing questions raised by virtual worlds for real world laws).
44 Kerr, supra note 14, at 35 7.
45 Id. at 357-58 (noting that courts and commentators often switch between external
and internal perspective in cyberlaw unknowingly).
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Virtualism has recently emerged primarily as a byproduct of the arrival
of cyberspace and virtual worlds. Nevertheless, I believe the virtualist
pespective is necessary for a sound conceptual and legal understanding
of cyberspace and cyberlaw issues.
I hope my ensuing exploration of a virtualist approach to
privacy in cyberspace might offer some insight into the ways that
perspective can be more than just about choosing, but also a way of
critiquing approaches to cyberlaw that fail to account for differences
between cyberspace and real space. The New Virtualism has important
things to say about a number of areas of cyberlaw problems, but to be
useful over the long term it must offer sound reasons for advocating a
virtualist perspective, demonstrating how it achieves important public
policy or legal aims.
III. PRIVACY'S DISCONTENT: CYBERSPACE
A. THE PRESENT SITUATION
We live in a "digital age."4 6 Politics, society and business deal
and trade in information with the assistance of technology. But
cyberspace-which I use in this Article as shorthand for the web of
private and public "electronics, computers, and communication
networks" (most predominantly, the Internet) that "interconnect the
world" 47 -0 ffers some of the greatest challenges to privacy. 48 With its
online media and technologies, 49 computer databases,5° and rising tide
of digital surveillance,5 l it has long been seen as a threat to privacy in
personal information, the "details about our lives we would most often
like to keep free from public view.",5 2 Not surprisingly, legal scholars
attempting to address privacy concerns in cyberspace have focused on
what Paul Schwartz and William Treanor call "the new privacy," that
is, a focus on "informational privacy" and information practices.5 3
46 Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1088, 1091 n.20 (2002) (quoting FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATIONAGE (1997)).
47 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1195 (1998).
48 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1610 & n.4 (1999).
49 See Kang, supra note 47, at 1195.
50 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATIONAGE 3-4, 13-22 (2004).
51 See Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297 (2004).
52 Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 231 (2004); see also
Lin, supra note 46, at 1091 n.19.
53 Paul M. Schwartz & William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2163, 2164 (2003) (writing that "work inside and outside of the legal academy"
has pointed to a "new privacy" focusing on fair information practices, in contrast
to "old" or "classic" notions of privacy).
12
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 10 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol10/iss1/6
10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 194 (2008)
Though defining "informational privacy" is no simple task, 4
the vast majority of legal scholars have adopted a definition similar to
that of the United States Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe55 -that
information privacy concerns a person's interest in avoiding (and
controlling) disclosure of personal matters. 6 There is no shortage of
proposals to achieve such control either in the United States or in other
countries, with governments and private industry entering the chorus. 7
Most legal scholars, influenced by the work of Lawrence Lessig,58
have approached the control aspect of information privacy as a form of
property interest59-that is, people ought to be able to control the
disclosure and flow of personal information because they have a
property interest or right in that information.6 °
Despite these ideas and proposals, privacy is not doing so well
these days. In fact, there are deep problems with the present
informational privacy paradigm. First, the very notion of "information
privacy" causes conceptual problems for our understanding of privacy
generally. The concept of privacy, says Daniel Solove, "is . . . in
disarray. ', 61 It appears to be "about everything, and therefore it appears
to be nothing. 62 To others, it is a "vague ' 63 or "chameleon-like
' 64
word that has lived a "vine-like existence. 65 After surveying the field
54 Lin, supra note 46, at 1093 ("Defining informational privacy is a dizzying
endeavor . . . ."); see also Kang, supra note 47, at 1202 ("Privacy is a chameleon
that shifts meaning depending on context.").
55 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (deciding a constitutional challenge to a New York statute that
required prescriptions for certain drugs to be reported to the state health
authorities, leading to the creation of numerous computerized records containing
with personal information like the names and addresses of those taking the drugs).
56 Id. at 598-99; see also Kang, supra note 47, at 1205; Lin, supra note 46, at 1094-
95 & n.41; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV.
815, 820 (2000).
5' Tal Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation Solutions For
the Troubles of Information Privacy In the Age Of Data Mining and the Internet
Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (2004) (writing of proposals to address
information privacy concerns being offer by commercial actors, including the
different legal the public policy proposals implemented in other countries and
jurisdictions).
58 LESSIG, supra note 31.
59 See Lin, supra note 46, at 1095 n.44 (citing Schwartz, supra note 56, at 820, and
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1446 (2001)).
60 See Jessica Litman, Information PrivacylInformation Property, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1283, 1287 (2001) (citing Kang, supra note 47, at 1246-94).
61 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477 (2006).
62 Id. at 479.
63 ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND
DOSSIERS 25 (1971).
64 Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government:
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 455, 458 (1995).
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of work on privacy in 1984, Judith Thomas remarked that nobody
seemed "to have any very clear idea what [privacy] is."' 66 Though
meant to generate more heat than light, there is certainly some truth to
these descriptions of present understandings of privacy.
Unfortunately, the idea of "information privacy" has not helped
matters. It simply adds another "category" or "type" to an already
complex definition. Today, the concept of privacy is often diced and
divided up, factionalized into separate categories.67 For example, Jerry
Kang divides privacy up into three "clusters" of concern: (a) physical
or "spatial" privacy; (b) decisional privacy; and (c) informational
privacy. 68 Anita Allen-Castellitto offers four basic types: physical,
decisional, proprietary and informational. 69 Daniel Solove offers an
even broader spectrum of groupings he deems "activities," such as
information collection, information processing, information
dissemination, and invasion.70 Indeed, getting to know privacy these
days is a complicated exercise in taxonomy.7'
Besides rendering conceptualization of privacy more complex
and less comprehensible, the present paradigm has other deep
problems. First, this model of informational privacy, based on
proprietary interest in personal information, offers little certainty in
determining privacy claims. In "real space" privacy claims "are often
understood as claims against intrusive state action, as a "right held
against the state's power to legislate. 72 But in cyberspace, property
interests, particularly those represented in copyright, often constitute
an equally and potentially greater threat to privacy interests than state73
action. Privacy claims will inevitably clash with property claims in
the context of cyberspace. But if privacy is understood mainly in terms
of property, there is an impasse in these competing interests.
65 Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 154 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1340 (1992).
66 Judith Jarvis Thomas, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schloeman ed., 1984).
67 See, e.g, Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, The Origins and Growth of U.S. Privacy Law,
632 PRACTICING L. INST./PATENTS 9, 16 (2001) (dividing privacy up into physical,
territorial, decisional, informational).
68 See Kang, supra note 47, at 1202-03; Lin, supra note 46, at 1093.
69 See Allen-Castellitto, supra note 67, at 16; Lin, supra note 46, at 1093.
70 Solove, supra note 61, at 489.
71 Id. at 485-86.
72Adam Hickey, Note, Betiveen Two Spheres: Comparing State and Federal
Approaches to the Right to Privacy and Prohibitions Against Sodomy, 111 YALE
L.J. 993, 994 n.8 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
737, 744-50 (1989) (detailing the history of American privacy cases wherein state
laws were held to be unconstitutional infringements on certain privacy interests).
73 Katyal, supra note 52, at 224 ("[P]roperty rights in cyberspace serve to form the
basis for a host of potentially offensive strategies that have deleterious
implications for privacy, anonymity, and freedom of expression").
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Take, for example, "piracy surveillance. 74 This involves
copyright holders conducting surveillance of people's online activities
to detect copyright violations.75 People may feel such surveillance is a
violation of their privacy, but if they assert their privacy rights in terms
of property interest, they will only run up against counterveiling
property interests in copyright. Here, both privacy and privacy-
infringing activities are asserted through property interests, with no
apparent calculus or analytical framework to decide between these
interests. Julie Cohen has recognized this normative gap. She has
argued that the present "property based" approach to informational
privacy reduces privacy to little more than individual commodity
preferences, such as consumer choices for "black shoes over brown or
red wine over white. 76 This is a problem because "values of
informational privacy are more fundamental" than these sorts of base
77preferences and choices. But she also acknowledges that the move
from fundamental ideas like human dignity to "fair information
practices" is a "leap. 7 8 Why should property interests in information
trump other sorts of property interests in copyright? Beyond simply
conferring property rights in personal information, a compelling
normative rationale must be offered .79 The present informational
privacy paradigm does not do so.
Moreover, without such a principled rationale to anchor
informational privacy to more "fundmental values" (in Cohen's
words), the privacy-as-property model collapses into commodification,
increasing the likelihood of privacy-infringing activities. Jessica
Litman convincingly argues that the idea of privacy-as-property
incentivizes both the collection and transfer of personal information in
cyberspace. 8° Once privacy is understood as an item that is owned as
property, commodification slips in, and the free movement of personal
information is encouraged. This is easy to see in Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P), one of Lessig's suggested solutions to privacy
problems in cyberspace. 8' P3P aims to empower user control over
74 Id. at 228.
75 id.
76julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423 (2000).
77 id.
781 d. at 1424.
79 Cohen tries to anchor informational privacy to the more "fundamental" ideas of
dignity or "informational autonomy," id. at 1423, though it ends up sounding much
like the "rhetorics of liberty" she criticizes as glossing over important normative
debates. Id. at 1423.
80 Litman, supra note 61, at 1296-98 (arguing that the privacy-as-property model is
based on a "fairy tale" assumption that legal ownership of information would
enable people to "restrain" their transfer and disclosure). Litman calls Platform for
Privacy Preferences (P3P), which Lawrence Lessig has championed for
informational privacy protection, the "posterchild" of this flawed assumption.
81 See LESSIG, supra note 31, at 160.
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personal data, to allow people to make informed decisions about their
personal information. 82 This is good. But part of this new architecture
is the implication that control is for the purpose of data transfer; that
personal data can, and perhaps ought to be, bought and sold, leading to
the transfer of personal information, the exact activity we ought to be
curtailing. If I have a property interest in something, I should be able to
sell or exchange it for other preferred goods. Property rights create
incentives for alienation and transfer. In fact, when Lessig discusses
P3P and similar solutions, he invokes the language of commerce,
saying that such code will allow people to properly "negotiate" the
terms on which their personal information will be taken.83 Litman's
point is that property interests lead to markets, which only reinforce
and promote the transfer and alienation of privacy information from
the person. Historically, when people have set out to facilitate the
transfer and movement of goods, they have imposed a property rights
model. 84 The privacy-as-property model creates the market for the
movement and sale of personal information, thus legitimizing rather
than restraining privacy infringement.8" I do not think this is inevitable.
If there is an intelligible normative framework to anchor privacy
interests in cyberspace, which tells us why privacy is important or
fundamental, the slide from "property interest" to transfer and
commodication may be avoided. But without that anchor, Litman's
concerns are very real. In fact, Lessig recognizes the shortcomings of
P3P and the need for "legal regulation" in his updated version of
Code.86
A further important concern involves constitutional protection.
There is little hope for the recognition of a constitutional right to
"information privacy," at least on the present conceptual approach.
Few commentators believe the U.S. Supreme Court will ever build
upon its passing and indirect reference to a type of informational
privacy in Whalen v. Roe.8 7 As Sonya Katyal has noted, the Court has
drawn a "firm line" between "substantive" ideas of privacy relating to
issues affecting personhood (like marriage and abortion) and
informational ones, 88 the former having constitutional protection whilst
the latter not. 89 The necessity of constitutional protection remains a
contentious issue in privacy scholarship. Early suggestions that
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 See Litman, supra note 60, at 1295-96.
85 See id. at 1295-96, 1301; see also Simon G Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to
Privacy: How Privacy has been Transformed from a Right to a Commodity, in
PHILIP E. AGRE & MARC ROTENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 143, 160 (1997) (writing that putting privacy in the "free market
environment" creates a situation where privacy "becomes a costly 'add-on"').
86 LESSIG, supra note 7, at 226-27.
87 See Lin, supra note 46, at 1089.
88 Katyal, supra note 51, at 308; Katyal, supra note 52, at 239.
89 Katyal, supra note 51, at 308; Katyal, supra note 52, at 240-4 1.
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constitutional protection was necessary for proper privacy protection9"
were dismissed by some privacy scholars as unlikely or unnecessary.91
But as privacy threats continue to grow in cyberspace, the case for
constitutional protection has been made more forcefully in recent
times. 92 I do not intend to settle this debate once and for all, but will
later offer good reasons why constitutional protection for informational
privacy is necessary and desirable. Suffice it to say, the present
conceptual approach to privacy offers little hope for constitutional
recognition in any case.
These problems likely contribute to the most important point-
strategies based on the present concept of information privacy do not
seem to be working, or, at the very least, have big problems. Today,
protection for information privacy in the United States is strewn
through a complex web of state and federal laws and regulations.
93
Complications with the function of these regulations, the definition and
scope of "informational privacy" and the rapidly changing nature of
cyberspace and related technology have revealed the "utter inability"
of this patchwork of statutes to "keep pace" and "ensure the protection
of privacy. 9 4 Particularly, federal statutes in the United States have
"faired poorly in cases involving information privacy on the
Internet. '95 Similarly, solutions to privacy concerns in tort law have
96been described as "generally useless" in cyberspace, or in Jessica
Litman's words, involve substantial effort yet ultimately weak
protections.97
B. THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM: WHALEN v. ROE
AND THE EXTERNALIST PERSPECTIVE
I believe the intellectual origins of these problems are found in
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Whalen v. Roe.98 Earlier, I noted
90 See David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data
Protection, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 831, 852 (1991) (arguing for "ultimate
protection" for informational privacy through constitutional entrenchment);
Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy,
71 B.U. L. REv. 133, 135 (1991) (arguing that informational privacy is a right the
Constitution protects).
91 See, e.g., CATE, supra note 46, at 66. Cate concludes that the there is little support
for informational privacy in the U.S. Constitution.
92 See Lin, supra note 46; Thomas B. Kearns, Note, Technology and the Right to
Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 975, 1003 (1999) (arguing that a "change in
constitutional interpretation ... would align privacy interests and privacy rights").
93 Katyal, supra note 52, at 232 ("Today, informational privacy derives its force from
a panoply of federal, state, and regulatory guidelines, many of which emerged from
the Code of Fair Information Practices over twenty years ago.").
94 d. at 232-33.
95 Lin, supra note 46, at 1114.
96 id.
97 Litman, supra note 60, at 1312.
98 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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that the vast majority of legal scholars have adopted a definition for
"informational" or "information privacy" similar to that in Whalen v.
Roe. There, the Court set out to categorize and define different types of
privacy interests in the context of the case and, in so doing, created
what I believe to be a problematic disconnect between informational
and other more established normative foundations for privacy. This
needs elaboration.
Privacy in records containing information about a person was
at issue in Whalen v. Roe. The U.S. Supreme Court had to determine
the constitutionality of a New York statute that required all
prescriptions for a certain class of drugs to be reported to the state
Department of Health. The computerized records contained the name,
age, and address of drug recipients and were retained for a period of
five years for security purposes, to help track unlawful distribution of
prescription drugs. A group of patients and physicians challenged the
constitutionality of the statute arguing, among other things, that it
violated their constitutional right to privacy. In dismissing this
argument, the Court distinguished between two separate privacy
interests:
The cases sometimes characterized as protecting
"privacy" have in fact involved at least two different
kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is
the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.99
On the one hand, there is a privacy interest in making important
decisions, and on the other, a privacy interest in non-disclosure of
personal information. This idea of privacy with its implicit idea of
controlling personal information in order to prevent unauthorized
disclosure is what most privacy scholars have used as the basis for
their definitions of "informational privacy." Though the Court went on
to suggest that there may be a constitutional basis for this type of
privacy, 00 it has yet to expand on this passing reference and, as noted
already, most commentators doubt it ever will.
But let us return to this distinction between a right of non-
disclosure and a right in making important decisions. The Court
separates these two types of privacy and deals with them individually,
finding that the statute was constitutional because it avoided
unreasonable disclosure.' 0 ' I believe this distinction in Whalen v. Roe
is a source for some of the conceptual and normative problems for
privacy in cyberspace, as it has two subtle but important implications.
First, on this reasoning, privacy in personal information ought to be
understood as distinct from fundamental decisions a person makes,
including intimate decisions about one's body. Contrary to the Court's
99 Id. at 598-99.
100 Id. at 605-06.
101 Id. at 601-02.
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holding, however, the patients did not view their privacy interest in
"avoiding disclosure of personal matters" as distinct from their broader
interest in having "independence" to make "important decisions." The
patients saw these as interrelated. This is apparent from the flow of
their argument, noted by the Court:
Appellees argue that both of these interests are impaired
by this statute. The mere existence in readily available
form of the information about patients' use of Schedule
II drugs creates a genuine concern that the information
will become publicly known and that it will adversely
affect their reputations. This concern makes some
patients reluctant to use, and some doctors reluctant to
prescribe, such drugs even when their use is medically
indicated. It follows, they argue, that the making of
decisions about matters vital to the care of their health is
inevitably affected by the statute. Thus, the statute
threatens to impair both their interest in the
nondisclosure of private information and also their
interest in making important decisions independently. 1
02
The patients were not just concerned with disclosure, but also the idea
that personal information in the hands of others would inhibit their
personal decisions about their health, in this case whether to seek drug
therapy. Their bid to prevent disclosure was inherently tied to their
interest in "making important decisions independently," the decisional
component of privacy. As Daniel Solove has noted, the plaintiffs were
concerned about their personal information-an "important part of
their lives"-being "in the distant hands of the state." 10 3 Concern over
this violation of privacy in personal information had a direct impact on
the things that the patients felt comfortable doing. In separating out
these interests as separate and distinct categories of privacy, the Court
disconnected the importance of privacy in information from privacy in
decisions, including the most private and intimate decisions, those
affecting our body and health. Julie Cohen correctly argues that
information privacy must be linked to "fundamental" values for more
robust privacy protection; yet here, information privacy is
disconnected from ideas that relate to fundamental notions of
personhood, that being the important decisions a person makes.
Second, the Court's distinction sundered any connection
between privacy in personal information and the rich body of
constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that offered some
foundation for a constitutional right to privacy. As noted by Daniel
Solove, the idea of decisional privacy in Whalen v. Roe was familiar to
the Court's jurisprudence, being linked to historic privacy cases like
Griswold v. Connecticut °4 and Roe v. Wade.0 5 In contrast, the idea of
102 Id. at 598-89.
103 SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 65.
104 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a statute that criminalized
contraceptives for married couples because it violated the "zone of privacy"
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privacy in non-disclosure "was one that the Court had not previously
defined.' °6 By setting privacy in data and information apart from
established constitutional privacy jurisprudence, it became very
unlikely that a constitutional right to informational privacy would ever
be fully developed or articulated in subsequent decisions. In fact, I
believe this is a primary reason why the Court so far has failed to do
so. In effect, the Court in Whalen v. Roe made informational and data
privacy a novel constitutional idea standing outside the jurisprudence,
rendering it exceedingly more difficult for subsequent courts to build
on the idea.
The critic might respond here and say: So what? In real space,
the distinction between informational and decisional privacy makes
sense. At issue in Whalen v. Roe were health records. Records are
objects that may contain personal information, but they are clearly
distinct from the person and the decisions she makes. In real space the
person, with all her interests, rights, and values, is disconnected from
such objects and the information they might contain, and it would be
silly to confuse the two. In a sense, Whalen v. Roe incorporates an
externalist perspective in its approach to informational privacy,
discussed earlier. An externalist perspective ignores cyberspaces and
virtual worlds and instead conceives the person in real space inputting
data and information into electronic or informational outlets, such as a
computer, or, in this case, health records. There is nothing wrong with
an externalist perspective. It is just one way of approaching the legal
and conceptual problems of privacy, and probably worked best on the
facts of Whalen v. Roe, which involved privacy concerns in real space,
and not cyberspace.
But privacy scholars have taken the definition of informational
privacy in Whalen v. Roe and transplanted it into the context of
cyberspace without acknowledging its implicit use of the externalist
perspective. Again, this is not surprising. Legal commentators have
often overlooked the perspective from which they are approaching
legal and factual issues of cyberspace. 10 7 But in doing so here, they
gloss over a number of important questions that, if answered, might
offer a more robust concept of privacy, and how it should be
understood in virtual worlds and spaces. For example, the distinction
between informational and decisional privacy blurs in the context of
cyberspace. Information that a person provides in cyberspace
inevitably and immediately impacts the course of their journey through
cyberspace, including the choices and options available for their
browsing or exploration. As Mark Stefik writes, code "determines
which people can access which digital objects,"' 18 but such regulation
apparent in the penumbras of various constitutional provisions and amendments).
105 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a women's decision to have an abortion is
protected by a constitutional right to privacy).
106 SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 65.
107 See Kerr, supra note 14, at 357-58.
108 MARK STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE: SOCIAL, TECHNICAL, AND LEGAL
CHALLENGES FOR ANETWORKED WORLD 14 (1999).
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can only be done through what Lessig calls "architectures of control,"
technologies of identification that use information about a user in
cyberspace to govern what they can see and do in cyberspace. 10 9
Unlike real space where architecture is often difficult to change
(fencing, building, land development, security systems, etc. all have
significant costs), in cyberspace architecture is determined by code
which can, and does, shift dramatically in response to user input.
Informational and decisional privacy are inherently linked in
cyberspace, and cannot be easily distinguished.
This brief point incorporates a virtualist perspective. That is, if
we think about a person not as sitting at their keyboard external to
virtual spaces (externalist view), but rather choosing, moving, and
negotiating within virtual spaces (virtualist view), we can see more
clearly how the distinction between information and decisionmaking
blurs in cyberspace. This is the important analytical difference that a
virtualist approach can offer. In fact, I believe many problems with
privacy in cyberspace previously outlined can be resolved by
discarding the externalism in Whalen v. Roe for a virtualist account of
privacy, which will not only simplify our concept of privacy in
cyberspace but reconnect it to stronger normative justifications and
constitutional foundations. But what exactly is a "virtualist" take on
privacy? And how can it resolve the normative and conceptual
problems with privacy apparent in the literature? In the next Part, I
take the first steps in answering these questions in setting out what I
call a virtualist account of privacy.
IV. A VIRTUALIST ACCOUNT OF PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE
The problems discussed in the last Part have led some to
abandon the project of understanding the concept of privacy altogether.
Daniel Solove has recently endeavored to "shift focus away from the
vague term" privacy, and instead focus on a project of cataloguing the
various specific activities that might be said to impinge upon
privacy."10 In this Article I also hope to shift the debate about privacy
in cyberspace, but not for the same reasons as Solove. Despite all the
problems legal scholars and philosophers have in figuring out how to
define privacy, average citizens seem to have a pretty good idea what it
is, and how information technology might pose problems for privacy
interests."'1 So while Julie Innis might say that philosophical
discussions on privacy are in "chaos," '"12 common understanding of
privacy is not a lost cause.
109 LESSIG, supra note 7, at 38, 43-54.
110 Solove, supra note 61, at 481-83.
111 For example, a 2001 survey by the Federal Trade Commission indicated 92% of
Americans were "concerned about threats to personal privacy when they use the
Internet" and 22% were "very concerned." See Federal Trade Commission
Materials, 1241 PRACTICING L. INST./CoRp. 731, 762 (2001).
112 JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 3 (1992).
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If the concept of privacy is "in disarray,"'' 3 particularly with
respect to cyberspace, it is not necessarily because we do not
understand the idea; privacy is, after all, a concept that has been around
since ancient times. 114 Rather, it is because scholars have not spent
enough time theorizing persons and personhood in cyberspace. That is,
privacy theorists have focused so heavily on defining the right to
privacy that they have neglected the right holder, and how we ought to
understand him or her within the space we call "cyberspace." This is
where a virtualist perspective can offer insight, and a different way of
thinking about cyberlaw issues, like privacy. The virtualist perspective
takes an "internal" point of view. That means approaching cyberlaw
problems from the perspective of a person internal to the virtual world
or reality created in the "world of cyberspace." l 5 The virtualist
theorizes the person as someone inhabiting virtual worlds, not in
physical but digital form, and choosing, communicating, and traversing
the terrain of cyberspace and virtual worlds. In other words, a virtualist
account involves an analysis of personhood, and how it ought to be
understood in cyberspace.
But before elaborating this account, it is worthwhile to note
precisely why addressing the question of personhood matters to privacy
protection in cyberspace. Personhood provides a conceptual and
normative framework for privacy-the idea being that privacy protects
the "integrity of the personality" or person. 16 Many traditional notions
of, and justifications for, privacy are linked to concepts of personhood.
Paul Freund, after an exhaustive survey of case law and literature in
1975, related privacy to "personhood," which he said referred to "those
attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood."
' 17
Brandeis and Warren famously based their idea of privacy on the
similar idea of "inviolate personality."'"18 Scholars like Edward
Bloustein' 9 and Jeffrey Reiman, 120 and philosophers like Stanley
Benn, 12 1 have all offered theories of privacy centered on ideas of
113 Solove, supra note 61, at 477.
114 See RICHARD HIxsoN, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONFLICT 3 (1987); BARRINGTON MOORE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL HISTORY 123 (1984) (discussing privacy in ancient Greece).
115 Kerr, supra note 14, at 357.
116 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1116 (2002).
117 j. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood." The Right to be Left Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J.
699, 702 n.15 (citing Paul Freund, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 52ND ANNUAL
MEETING 42-43 (1975)).
118 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193, 205, 207 (1890).
119 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964) (arguing that privacy protects against
conduct that is "demeaning to individuality").
120 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, andPersonhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39
(1976) (asserting that privacy is "essential" to a "complex social practice" of
recognition that is a "precondition to personhood").
121 Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, NOMOS XII:
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personhood. Jed Rubenfeld thus described personhood as the "reigning
explanatory concept" on privacy 122 and today, privacy scholars still
focus on it. 123 Privacy to a large degree coalesces around the idea of
personhood; so if we wish to think about privacy in cyberspace, we
should first think about personhood.
A. PERSONHOOD [N CYBERSPACE
Personhood speaks to those very basic things that make us
people-in Paul Freund's terms, the irreducible "attributes of an
individual.', 124 Personhood thus relates to things like "individuality,
autonomy, and dignity."' 125 Part of being an individual is expressing
our own unique desires, dreams, goals, and opinions. We make
important personal choices and expect others, particularly family and
friends, to respect those choices and our responsibility to make them.
Respecting personhood means respecting these things, as taking them
away, or disrespecting them, would be an affront to our dignity.
Classical theories of privacy set out to protect people and to guarantee
that respect. Privacy can and should do the same thing in cyberspace.
Central to contemporary theories of privacy and personhood is
the idea of self-creation and personal development. Privacy is a "social
practice" or ritual that creates the necessary space for personal
experimentation and choice, creativity, self-examination, open
communication, and dialogue with significant others-those things
necessary to allow a person to "shape" his or her "destiny."1 26 Privacy
not only facilitates development of the self, but preserves such
development by protecting and respecting the integrity and dignity of
the person.' 27 Since personal development and coming to personhood
is an ongoing process throughout our lives, privacy is essential to
personhood because it creates the conditions necessary for its
continuing development and preservation. 128 Privacy is a precondition
to personhood.
These ideas focusing on the individual and personal choices
and self-development are linked, at least in part, to traditional theories
of the person and personhood. A Kantian theory understands the
PRIVACY 26, 26 (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971) (explaining
privacy as respect for someone as a person, and his or her interest in personal
development).
122 Rubenfeld, supra note 72, at 739 (1989).
123 See, e.g, Solove, supra note 116, at 1116-19 (discussing personhood theories of
privacy).
124 Craven, supra note 117.
125 Solove, supra note 116, at 1116.
126 See Benn, supra note 121, at 26; Reiman, supra note 121, at 39; Solove, supra
note 116, at 1116.
127 See Reiman, supra note 120, at 39; Solove, supra note 116, at 1116-17.
128 See Reiman, supra note 120, at 39-40.
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person as a free individual, a rational agent that is an end in itself.129
The Kantian person is an abstract one, a conscious, rational, self-
determining individual, with preferences and desires. Locke's idea of
the person was also abstract, but conceptually distinct from the Kantian
view. Locke understood the person as:
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and
reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same
thinking thing, in different times and places; which it
does only by that consciousness which is inseparable
from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it
being impossible for any one to perceive without
perceiving that he does perceive. 130
Both Kant and Locke theorized people as contemplative beings,
choosing, thinking, and doing. But where Kant emphasized rationality,
Locke also believed continuing consciousness and memory were
essential attributes of the person. 13 1 Rational choice is only part of it.
Those choices also shape our selves and identities over time.
Consciousness and memory are the link between choice and self-
growth.
But as Margaret Jane Radin notes, both of these "classical
views" approach persons as "disembodied minds or immaterial
essences." 132 Theorists in modern times have thus criticized these
classical views as neglecting the importance of embodiment, and
bodily continuity. 133 People are more than just floating disembodied
minds; we experience the world and are recognized within and through
our bodies. The body, or the idea of embodiment and personhood, is
important to privacy. Scholars have argued that one of the key origins
of privacy is in property rights, 134 particularly Lockean theories of
property. But that link in many ways was a product of Locke ascribing
importance to the body, and our intimate control over our bodies or
persons. In the Second Treatise of Civil Government, Locke connected
property to the person, noting that "every man has a property in his
own person: this no body has any right to but himself."' 135 In a sense,
the body, and our intimate control over it, was the foundation of
129 DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 78-79 (1986).
130 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. XXVII,
§ 9 (1690), available at
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/1/locke/j ohn/18 lu/complete.html.
131 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 963 (1982)
(discussing Kantian and Lockean theories of the person).
132 id
133 See, e.g., BARBARA BROOK, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE BODY 1 (1999)
("What about the body . . . ?"); see also DAVID BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CYBERCULTURES 138-39 (2002); Radin, supra note 131.
134 Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property
in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26 (1996).
135 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 27 (1690), available at
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/1/locke/j ohn/18 is/.
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Locke's theory of property, which understood labor as the basis for
property rights in "the earth," which is originally "common to all
men."
, 136
In contrast to these classical theories, contemporary theories of
personhood recognize the importance of the body. If the integrity and
dignity of the person is a central normative focus, then privacy in the
body and its control, preservation, and inviolability is essential. But
this involves more than a Lockean notion of a property interest in the
body. It is, as Rieman points out, much more fundamental:
The right to privacy is the right to the existence of a
social practice which makes it possible for me to think
of this existence as mine. This means that it is the right
to conditions necessary for me to think of myself as the
kind of entity for whom it would be meaningful and
important to claim personal and property rights. It
should also be clear that the ownership of which I am
speaking is surely more fundamental than property
rights. 
37
Again, if privacy creates the conditions necessary for personhood, by
protecting and preserving the "attributes of an individual which are
irreducible,"'' 38 then it is prior to any idea of property right or interest.
Is cyberspace any different? What are the "irreducible
attributes" of the person in cyberspace that privacy must protect?
When I assume an online identity or persona, I am in a Kantian sense
still a rational agent and, following Locke, retain a continuing memory
and consciousness, not only of my life and identity in real space, but of
my activities in cyberspace. So traditional theories of the person
certainly still apply, but in focusing solely on attributes of
consciousness or theory of mind, they are unable to speak to the
differential character of traversing and experiencing virtual worlds and
cyberspaces. Moreover, as noted above, critics maintained that
traditional theories of the person ignored the physical aspects of being:
the limits and boundaries of the body and how we as people interact
with the environment. These questions must be explored in relation to
cyberspace, too, if personhood is to be properly understood.
So personhood in cyberspace concerns not only real space
issues but understanding "the person" in virtual space. In real space the
person, and his or her body, is more easily discerned and defined
through physical bodily limits and fixed architecture. But in
cyberspaces, with their differing electronic environments and shifting
digital architecture, platforms, code, identities, and technological
capacity, things are a little more complicated. So rather than a unified
subject, there are multiple forms of the virtual person in cyberspace.139
136 id.
137 Reiman, supra note 120, at 43.
138 Craven, supra note 117.
139 Maria Lugones notably claimed that she was "giving up the claim that the subject
is unified." Instead, she would approach "each person" as "many." Virtual
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I will discuss three virtualist 140 accounts of the person here: (1) the
virtual person in complete virtual reality environments; (2) the virtual
person in 3D virtual worlds; and (3) the virtual person as embodied
information on the Internet. The latter two notions of personhood in
cyberspace are likely most relevant to legal and constitutional
protection of privacy, being the ones most people will experience when
negotiating cyberspace, but there are likely others. 14 1 This discussion
should, in any case, offer a clearer picture of what constitutes
personhood in cyberspace, the "irreducible attributes" of the virtual
person.
1. The Virtual Person in Complete Virtual Reality Environments
The idea of people existing as entities within virtual spaces or
"virtual reality" as an alternative to real space has been popular in
modern science fiction. William Gibson is credited with coining the; r 142
term "cyberspace" in his 1984 novel Neuromancer. Gibson
famously described cyberspace as a "consensual hallucination" and
wrote about the "bodiless exultation of cyberspace" where people
"jack in" and leave the "meat" of the physical body.143 Such ideas
about the synthesis of technology and flesh, virtual reality, and the
possibilities of complete virtualized living environments have inspired
a whole genre of cultural studies some have called "cyber-cultural
theory," which analyzes the nature of virtual spaces and human
behavior within it. 144 As Anne Balsamo notes, virtual reality has
become an "industry in itself."'
145
Virtual reality technologies create three dimensional
environments into which a person can "enter" and fully interact. 146 The
personhood fits well with Lugones's theory of personal identity in this way. See
Maria Lugones, StructurelAntistructure andAgency Under Oppression, 87 J. PIRL.
500, 503 (1990).
140 These accounts are "virtualist" in that they approach the person and body from the
perspective of being internal to cyberspace or the virtual environment.
141 Given the ongoing development of virtual and digital technologies, it would be
impossible to conceive of all possible forms of the "personhood" in cyberspace
now and in the future.
142 WILLAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984).
143 Id at 12, 67.
144 See, e.g., ANN BALsAMo, TECHNOLOGIES OF THE GENDERED BODY: READING
CYBORG WOMEN (1996); DAVID BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERCUTURES
(2002); THE CYBERCULTURES READER (David Bell & Barbara Kennedy eds.,
2002); CYBERSPACE/CYBERBODIES/CYBERPUNK: CULTURES OF TECHNOLOGICAL
EMBODIMENT (Michael Featherstone & Robert Burrows eds., 1995); THE CYBORG
HANDBOOK (Chris Grey ed., 1995); MARK DERY, ESCAPE VELOCITY:
CYBERCULTURE AT THE END OF THE CENTURY (1996); MARTIN DODGE & ROB
KITCHIN, MAPPING CYBERSPACE (2000); Donna Haraway, Cyborgs and Symbionts:
Living Together in the New World Order, in THE CYBORG HANDBOOK 11, supra.
145 Anne Balsamo, The Virtual Body in Cyberspace, in THE CYBERCULTURES
READER, supra note 144, at 489.
146 Id at 490.
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"cyberspace" here is, literally, the virtual space that a person finds
themselves experiencing and moving within the virtual environment.
The goal of producing complete virtual environments was originally
linked to military research, as well as initiatives in the entertainment
industry. 47 Often, this notion of virtual reality, what Balsamo calls its
"celebrated media form," envisions special forms of technology for
complete bodily submersion. 148 Thus, the experience requires virtual
reality "headsets" and "data gloves" and other innovations necessary
for a person to fully escape the limits of real space and the physical
body. 1
49
Complete virtual reality environments are usually promoted as
means of freeing oneself from the constraints of real space and the
physical body.150 The person is freed from the body. But this betrays
the importance of personhood and the body to virtual reality
environments. In actuality, virtual reality technology relies heavily on
the physical body and aims to respond to typical body movements,
sensations and expression that we usually experience in day to day life.
Virtual reality technology attempts to translate information received
from the body (and its movements) into a virtualized environment
where that information is used to constitute your experience. You
receive information about the virtual world with which you interact
through your senses (via the virtual reality technology), and the
technology must receive and process those responses and interactions
within the simulated environment to create the virtual reality
experience. Information transfer and processing is two way.
The ideal virtual reality technology would offer a seamless
interaction between our body in real space and the virtual environment
being experienced. But that technology has not yet arrived. The
amount of information processing power necessary for such seamless
interaction has not been developed and might never be. But before
moving on, two points should be stressed. First, information and data
plays a key role in this concept of the virtual person. Our 3D persona
in the virtual reality environment is created, manipulated, and thus
constituted by data provided by our bodies and processed by the virtual
reality technology. The virtual person is constituted by information and
data about us, and our body. Second, the notion of a virtual body is not
denied here either. There may be things about our bodies we can
change in the complete virtual environment, and we may experience
simulated events not usual for everyday life in real space, but this does
not mean the body or person is irrelevant; it just means it is less static
than usually thought.
147 See BELL, supra note 144, at 140 (talking about "leaving the body" behind as a
"recurrent theme in cyberculture").
148 Balsamo, supra note 145, at 492-93; BELL, supra note 144, at 140.
149 BELL, supra note 144, at 14-16 (writing of "VR stories" of virtual reality
technology).
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2. The Virtual Person As Avatar in 3D Virtual Worlds
Full-fledged virtual reality technology is not necessary for ideas
of persons or personhood in virtual spaces. The rise of virtual worlds
and associated innovations like virtual property and commerce offers a
similar conceptual understanding of persons in cyberspace, without
science-fiction tools or advanced technology. These virtual worlds
have emerged in the form of electronic communities1 51 or complex
online multiplayer games (also known as Massive Multiple Online
Role Playing Games or MMOGs).15 2 These virtual worlds and
communities do not require technology for full body submersion
within the virtual experience; instead, a user can create a fully three-
dimensional person (and radically new virtual bodily and personal
identity) in the 3D virtual world, through which he can live, work, and
play. A good example of this is the popular online community Second
Life. Second Life is a "3-D virtual world" that is "built and owned" by
members of the Second Life world. The community offers the
complete "architecture of modern societies" with "clothing, buildings,
vehicles, and opportunities for starting online businesses."'1
53
According to Second Life's website, as of mid-2007 there were nearly
7 million members of the virtual community from "around the
globe.' 54
Second Life users negotiate the three dimensional virtual space
in the community with a user avatar, which is a visible representation
of their persona in the virtual world. 55 People can define their avatar
as they wish, similar to or completely different from their actual
physical appearance. The avatar is a 3D character that is completely
controlled by the member; the avatar is the person in the virtual world.
In fact, Second Life goes far in offering a kind of virtual living-
community members can build homes, create art, have relationships
with other members of the Second Life world, and make money by
trading, buying, and selling their personal virtual items. Indeed, virtual
property and virtual commerce in Second Life have grown
considerably since 2003, with millions of user-to-user transactions of
user-created or owned content and items taking place every year.156
151 Viktor Mayer-Sch5nberger & John Crowley, Napster 's Second Life? The
Regulatory Challenge of Virtual Worlds, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 1775, 1779 (2006)
(referring to Lineage, EverQuest, and Second Life).
152 See, e.g, Grimmelmann, Virtual Worlds, supra note 36, at 147 n.1 (referring to
virtual worlds in large multiplayer online games); Mayer-Sch6nberger & Crowley,
supra note 152, at 1781-83.
153 Mayer-Sch6nberger & Crowley, supra note 151, at 1787.
154 Second Life, What is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis/ (last visited Mar.
29, 2008).
155 Second Life, Create an Avatar, http://secondlife.com/whatis/avatar.php (last
visited Mar. 29, 2008).
156 Mayer-Sch6nberger & Crowley, supra note 151, at 1787 (citing Cory Ondrejka,
Escaping the Gilded Cage: User Created Content and Building the Metaverse, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 81, 93-94 (2004)).
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The virtual person, or avatar, in the 3D virtual world is
essentially a culmination of data and information-data provided by
the person to define and shape their 3D avatar and information relating
to the present and past activities of the avatar. This is often called user
or "player data.' 157 Player data can include information entered as part
of the avatar's profile as well as the virtual activities of the avatar, such
as the different times the avatar engages in certain virtual activities, the
types of virtual items bought, places visited, and other virtual persons,
or avatars, the virtual person has contacted. 1
58
Player data is also categorized. It is often defined as either
involving identifiable personal information (IPI) or non-identifiable
personal information (non-IPI). 5 9 IPI is information relating to the
actual person (in real space) behind the avatar. It can include
information about personal characteristics such as culture, age, religion
and social status, employment, or credit history, as well as personal
contact information like name, mailing address, telephone number, or
email. 160 Non-IPI usually concerns "in-world" information. That is,
information about online or virtual activities within cyberspace or
virtual worlds that do not link the online persona to the person's actual
identity in real space. Non-IPI involves information gathered from web
browsing activities across websites, or from data provided to, or by,
third parties. In virtual communities, it can include, as noted above,
player data relating to virtual activities and virtual commerce with no
connection to IPI.
Privacy policies often treat IPI and non-IPI differently.
Generally speaking, IPI receives a greater measure of privacy
protection than non-IPI. 162 For example, Linden Lab (creators of
Second Life) explicitly forbids the disclosure of IPI in its "Community
Standards":
Disclosure
Residents are entitled to a reasonable level of privacy
with regard to their Second Lives. Sharing personal
information about a fellow Resident - including gender,
157 Zarsky, supra note 36, at 248 (including in player data "data pertaining to the
times of the day the player engages in play in general and specific virtual activities
in particular, the parts of the virtual world the user visits and the goods she buys,
exchanges, and consumes, the other avatars he or she chooses to interact with and
the times they do so").
158 id
159 ld at 249.
160 Network Advertising Initiative, Frequently Asked Questions Nos. 3, 4,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/faqs.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2008).
161 Id. at No. 4 ("Non-Personally Identifiable Information (Non-IPI) is information
that is anonymous or not linked to a particular person. Used for OPM by network
advertisers, this data consists mostly of click-stream information (sites you have
visited or links you have clicked) compiled as you move across different Web sites
or a single site .... ").
162 Zarsky, supra note 36, at 249.
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religion, age, marital status, race, sexual preference, and
real-world location beyond what is provided by the
Resident in the First Life page of their Resident profile
is a violation of that Resident's privacy. Remotely
monitoring conversations, posting conversation logs, or
sharing conversation logs without consent are all
prohibited in Second Life and on the Second Life
Forums.
163
So there is an expectation of privacy between Second Life users with
respect to IPI. Linden Lab also sets out in its Privacy Policy that it does
not disclose personal information to third parties without permission of
the user (with a few enumerated exceptions).164 But they do not clearly
indicate that non-personal information is protected from disclosure,
such as the "other pieces of data" mentioned in section 2 of the Privacy
Policy, said to be gathered from web traffic, user computer hardware,
or Second Life usage. Interestingly, player data can also be public or
private within the virtual world. There will invariably be areas in
virtual communities inhabited by other members where disclosure of
certain information will mean that information is no longer private.
Such disclosure is done through display on the avatar profile, user chat,
or other forms of virtual activities. Thus, much like the traditional
understanding of public and private information, personal information
disclosed to other Second Life users, or in "public areas" in the Second
Life virtual world, will no longer be treated by Linden Lab as
confidential. 165 Player data is thus central to the virtual person in the
3D virtual world. And it is a product of information provided by the
creator of the avatar, but also the avatar's activities in his or her virtual
community.
In the cyberspace of either the completely virtual environment
of virtual reality technology, or the 3D virtual communities of Second
Life or EverQuest, conceiving of personhood in cyberspace is quite
easy: We visualize the body in space the same way we understand our
body in real space. The avatar acts as we do in real space, moving,
living, forming relations. Our life choices and preferences are
expressed through our avatar, and we respond and relate to others
through that same avatar, just as we do in real space. These virtual
worlds offer new spaces and social communities to explore while
expanding or transforming our individual identity. 166 A lot of cyber-
cultural literature focuses on this very idea-how cyberspace and
163 Second Life, Community Standards, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php (last
visited Mar. 29, 2008).
164 Second Life, Privacy Policy, http://secondlife.com/corporate/privacy.php (last
visited Mar. 29, 2008).
165 id
166See Sherry Turkle, Our Split Screens, in COMMUNITY IN THE DIGITAL AGE:
PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE 101, 108 (Andrew Feenberg & Darin Barney eds.,
2004) ("[R]elatively consequence-free experimentation facilitates the development
of a 'core self,' a personal sense of what gives life meaning .... "); Zarsky, supra
note 36, at 251.
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virtual worlds liberate the person from his or her real-space identity,
and allow creative self-invention and transformation. 67 Moreover, this
experimentation can foster better community cohesion and belonging
by fostering tolerance and diversity. 16 8 For many regulars of virtual
worlds and communities, their virtual personas can be more significant
to their identities than their lives in real space.169
But this separate virtual identity expressed through the virtual
person is maintained with a strong divide, if not barrier, between our
physical life in real space, and our online virtual person. A person
would not feel comfortable doing certain virtual activities, or engaging
with certain people in virtual worlds, if those activities could be linked
back to their identity in real space. This is the liberation afforded by
anonymity in cyberspace, a shelter for unconventional speech, belief,
association, personal preference, and experimentation otherwise
suppressed by unpopularity or difference. 170 People often become
involved in virtual worlds and communities because they offer a
different community to inhabit, learn, and grow. But this sense of
belonging and community is threatened where virtual activities, both
unconventional and benign, are subject to public exposure or
knowledge through linkage to their daily lives in real space.
Reputations in real space can be affected by activities in cyberspace.
Reputation can work the other way too. Tal Zarksky makes this
point in his discussion of "virtual reputations."' 171 Regulars of virtual
gaming or virtual worlds can spend years constructing and shaping
alternative identities and reputations.172 Those virtual reputations can
be detrimentally affected by information about the person's actual life
in real space. Personally identifiable categories like race, gender, class,
and sexual orientation are not necessarily fixed in virtual space. People
can experiment and cross these social boundaries. But those
experiments are threatened, or can be obliterated, by information about
someone's life or identity in real space. Given the cultural importance
of the aforementioned categories, it is not hard to see how someone
167 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 44, 6-29; LISA NAKAMURA, CYBERCULTURE TYPES:
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY ON THE INTERNET (2002); Turkle, supra note 166.
168 See SHERRY ThRKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE
INTERNET 261-62 (1995) (experimentation of multiple selves facilitates
understanding of diversity, in contrast to the norm of the "unitary and solid self').
169 See Lastowka & Hunter, Virtual World, supra note 36, at 52 n.280 (describing the
growing numbers of people who inhabit virtual worlds and the importance of these
virtual communities to their lives).
170 See Cohen, supra note 76, at 1425.
171 See Zarsky, supra note 36, at 246 (discussing the case reported in Jim Schaefer,
Sex and the Simulated City: Virtual World Raises Issues in the Real One, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Jan. 27, 2004). As Zarsky describes it, in this case the identity of one
player was revealed by another to be a teenage boy. The disclosure had a serious
impact on the "reputation" of the player, as he had been carrying on the virtual
persona of a female prostitute. After the disclosure, the player was "obviously"
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posing as a virtual person from a different gender or race in Second
Life might be treated differently by other users once information about
their actual gender or race is disclosed.
Virtual personhood in 3D worlds is, like that of complete
virtual reality environments, conceived like our physical persons in
real space. We have bodies and we live and engage with others in our
community. But the virtual person is, in addition, constituted by
information and data. Not only is the very fabric of being within virtual
worlds constituted by information like player data (such as information
provided to create a 3D avatar) but our "virtual" choices, activities,
identities, and conduct are also influenced by the flow, exposure, and
availability of that information; thus a protective two-way barrier
between the virtual person and real person is afforded by the
anonymity of cyberspace.
3. The Internet: The Virtual Person as Embodied Information
Unfortunately, the science fiction ideas of William Gibson are
not accurate descriptions of most people's everyday experiences in
cyberspace; virtual reality is a developing technology, and certainly not
common in households of the average family. Similarly, though online
communities like EverQuest and Second Life continue to grow, most
people are not members and will not be anytime soon. For most,
cyberspace involves negotiating the Internet, and its plethora of
discussion boards, websites, file servers, and 2D databases and
communities. In these circumstances, without the benefit of a complete
three-dimensional world, the externalist perspective seems more
natural: People surfing on the web are best understood as real people
sitting in front of their computers in real space, rather than any kind of
virtual identity or person like that in Second Life.
Still, the virtualist perspective can offer insights here. As Orin
Kerr explains, when a person logs onto the Internet and then visits a
website like Amazon.com, a virtualist perspective understands the
person as visiting a virtual store, looking among the digitized aisles of
books and music in much the same way as a customer visits the
bookstore in real space.173 A Gibson-esque synthesis of technology and
flesh is not necessary to understand cyberspace from a virtualist
perspective. But what is the virtual person on the Internet? I call it the
virtual person as embodied information. Unlike the 3D avatar of
Second Life it is more difficult to conceive of virtual persons in the
context of simple electronic commerce in virtual stores or wall
postings in text-based virtual communities. Yet, this idea is more
familiar and intuitive on closer look.
Privacy scholars have already come to identify bits of
information and data (particularly those that reveal intimate details
about us) that can be collected by tracking a person's movements on
the Internet as constituting a form of virtualized person, or persona.
Daniel Solove writes:
173 Kerr, supra note 14, at 362-63.
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Digital technology enables the preservation of the
minutia of our everyday comings and goings, of our
likes and dislikes, of who we are and what we own. It is
ever more possible to create an electronic collage that
covers much of a person's life - a life captured in
records, a digital person composed in the collective
computer networks of the world.174
The collection of intimate information about a person, what Solove
calls a "digital person" or "digital dossier,"' 175 can offer a detailed and
complete mapping of the person, a "life captured in records." Our
identities, personal preferences, interests, relationships (online and
offline), health, hobbies, and work are embodied in the information
volunteered by us online, or collected about us through our daily
sojourns in virtual worlds, electronic landscapes and virtual
commerce. 176 Similarly, Katyal invokes the "virtual persona"'177 and
Patrica Mell the "electronic persona."' 178 This electronic "compilation
of bits of personal information concerning the individual" can perform
a number of different functions for varying parties in the digital
context, including acting as an invaluable information resource for
governmental and commercial entities. 179 Our identity and persona in
cyberspace is very much the information about us.
Does it make any sense to analogize a profile of data and
information to ideas like virtual bodies and persons? In real space it
makes little sense, but in cyberspace it does on several levels. First, the
idea of the virtual person as embodied information is not inconsistent
with traditional theories of personhood that spoke to consciousness and
memory. Following Lockean or Kantian theories, when we traverse
online communities and worlds our subjective consciousness remains
intact; we are as we were before, though we sometimes assume
different signifiers of identity (such as using a different username to
explore with anonymity). Our memories, consciousness, thoughts, and
desires carry over from real space, though they might be expressed
differently with the new landscapes and anonymity that cyberspace
provides. The difference with this approach to personhood in
cyberspace is an emphasis on how the virtual person is constituted by
174 SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 1.
175 Id at 1-2.
176 Online search histories collected by Google, Yahoo, and MSN search engines are
a good example of this. Take Google, for instance: not only is every search request
entered by a user recorded and stored by Google, but the searches are logged to a
specific IP address. Every single online search can be linked back to a specific
location in cyberspace. This information can be retrieved by Google, and in fact
the U.S. government has asked for this information before (though Google refused,
Yahoo and MSN did not). See LESSIG, supra note 7, at 204.
177 Katyal, supra note 52, at 243.
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bits of data and information online, so that from a virtualist perspective
we understand the person as an embodiment of that information.
Second, the virtualist perspective requires relinquishing ideas
of physical bodies and persons for virtual ones. After all, the divide
between the "physical person" and information about the person is
hard to maintain in the informational landscapes of cyberspace. The
law often draws a clear line between the physical body or the person,
and information and records about the person. The former retains
strong legal and privacy protections, and the latter much less so. But
just as the distinction between decisional and informational privacy is
blurred in cyberspace, so too is the distinction between the person and
information about the person.' 80 A good example of this is
computerized medical health information, particularly electronic
databases containing complete maps of a person's genetic code or bio-
metric information which offer an individualized "link" (like DNA
fingerprinting) between the record and a specific person.' 8 ' Such
information often constitutes some of the most intimate details about a
person and the life they lead today or tomorrow. Traditional
distinctions between physical bodily integrity and information about
the body are unable to account for the ways in which intimate details
about our physical bodies are being integrated into informational
systems and digitized records.1 2 You cannot study, understand, or
track a person's genetic code without a material rendering of it, and
cannot analyze, store, or quantify it without an information or digital
records system. Here, the physical body becomes, in Irma van der
Ploeg's words, the "body as information."' 8 3 New conceptual and
normative categories of privacy are thus required, as the old categories
of bodily integrity ("the person") and information ("representations of
the person") break down.' 4
Additionally, the virtual person as embodied information
captures an important aspect of online experience that links autonomy
and liberty to informational identity. Privacy scholars like Patricia
Mell often decry how personal information collected about people
from their activities in cyberspace is used by governments for
decisionmaking and by commercial entities for market research. 18 But
there is a further dimension to this in how the information we volunteer
or is tracked about us shapes the places we can go, the things we can
180 Irma van der Ploeg points out that data protection regimes, such as the European
Directive on Data Protection, focus on informational privacy but neglect the ways
that the body itself is being integrated within information systems, blurring the
lines between (physical) bodily integrity and protection of personal information
about the body. Irma van der Ploeg, Biometrics and the Body, in SURVEILLANCE AS
SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 57, 66-67 (David
Lyon ed., 2003).
181 Id. at 63-64.
182 Id at 66-67.
183 See id. at 64.
114 Id. at 66-67.
185 Mell, supra note 134, at 3.
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see, and the choices we make in the cyberspaces we traverse. This
information is what we defined earlier as non-IPI. This data is not
linked to your actual physical identity, but can still be used to shape,
constrain, and alter your travels in cyberspace. As Lessig has taught us,
in real space architecture can limit where we can traverse, but many of
these barriers are static and unchanging. Thus, a wall or fence prevents
us from trespassing in a yard, but the public road remains open for our
use regardless of our identity. In cyberspace, architecture is much more
fluid, determined primarily by code, software, and hardware
limitations.
The architecture of cyberspace can also shift and change in
accordance with the specific person doing the traveling and exploring.
On a simple level, this is apparent with passwords that restrict access
to certain sites online. Only those who have the password can gain
access. But there are other more sophisticated forms of verification,
such as "cookie" files, tiny files on your hard drive that help sites
identify you and your computer on future Visits.186 People often allow
cookies to move freely between their computer and the various sites
visited online. Cookies offer not only a form of digital verification, but
also accumulate and provide information about user preference;
cookies can tell a site (like Amazon.com) information about the user,
like the types of music they prefer, the movies they have purchased, or
online searches previously conducted. This data shapes the choices
made available as the user negotiates Amazon.com's virtual shelves. '
8 7
Other forms of informational identification in cyberspace
similarly shape the online experience, like "digital certificates" that
reside on your computer and act, in Lessig's terms, as a form of
"passport" to negotiate sites, allowing access in some places and
restricting it in others.188 Again, these things speak to aspects of
personhood, our "individuality, dignity, and autonomy." 8 9 Information
about us affects our freedom and autonomy; it shapes the places we
can go in cyberspace, the same way our physical bodies limit the
places we can go in real space. The virtual person as embodied
information recognizes this reality. This is important. For as these
"architectures of control" and digital forms of "authentication' 90
develop and advance, this aspect of online experience will only
magnify and become of greater concern to those like Lessig, who are
concerned about privacy, freedom and liberty in cyberspace.
Consistent with the New Virtualism, the idea of the virtual
person as embodied information speaks to our experience within
cyberspace, but draws connections to our lives in real space. That is,
we are two persons-even two bodies-the one in real space, which is
186 See LESSIG, supra note 7, at 47.
"'Amazon will recommend books and others things to buy. See LESSIG, supra note
30, at 34.
188 Id at 35.
189 Solove, supra note 116, at 1116.
190 LESSIG, supra note 30, at 30-3 1.
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constituted by our physical bodies (from an external or realist
perspective), and the one in cyberspace (from a virtualist perspective),
which is constituted by the "body as information." The "body as
information" includes the very basic information that makes our travels
in cyberspace possible (such as our physical IP address) and more
intimate personal information, such as IPI and data about our lives and
health often volunteered by us (sometimes unknowingly) or collected
through subtle tracking of our movements and activities online. 191 But
the virtual person as embodied information also emphasizes the
important connections between these two personas; for as van der
Ploeg has illustrated, the virtual person implicates many intimate
aspects of our physical well-being in real space. The point here is not
that intimate information creates an actual physical bodily form in
virtual spaces cut off from our selves in real space, but from a virtualist
account, this information is central to our identity and personhood in
cyberspace.
B. CONCEPTUALIZING VIRTUALIST PRIVACY
The externalist view quietly pervades privacy scholarship on
cyberspace. 192 Perhaps for practical reasons, it makes sense for lawyers
and judges to think of people in the everyday sense, as people who
live, who have jobs and families and common responsibilities, and
also, perhaps on a daily basis, communicate through or explore
cyberspace. Here, cyberspace simply refers to a lot of wires and
hardware: computer stations, file servers, databases, networks,
software applications and, of course, code. People do not "enter"
cyberspace, they simply use it, sitting at their computer desks or
laptops. We are always outside looking in. And so is the law. A
virtualist would say this externalist account ignores the unique
experience of traversing cyberspace and virtual worlds. We must, as a
starting point, investigate the person as present within a virtual place in
ways different from real or physical space.
I have attempted to explore some of the different dimensions of
personhood in cyberspace. This is important, since personhood, to a
large extent, provides a conceptual and normative framework for
privacy-it protects the "integrity" of the person. 193 But more
questions are raised here. How do we conceptualize privacy with
respect to these different ideas about personhood in cyberspace? The
primary purpose of my argument here has been to demonstrate the
utility of the virtualist perspective and shift the frame of discussion to
191 Katyal, supra note 52, at 255 ("Today, techniques of data collection are especially
pernicious because they are subtle, ongoing, largely unregulated, and inextricably
linked to a person's online activities. Various entities collect an enormous amount
of personal information from users with scant attention to the moral and legal
privacy implications raised by its collection.").
192 But as Orin Kerr notes, there are some important exceptions, like the work of
Lawrence Lessig. See Kerr, supra note 14, at 370-371.
193 See Solove, supra note 116, at 1116 (describing the personhood conception of
privacy).
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focus less on dividing, categorizing, and dicing up our ideas and
concepts of privacy, and think more about the subject of privacy being
the person (or the virtual person); as such, I do not intend to set out an
exhaustive account of "virtualist privacy." I will, however, offer a
basic theoretical framework and raise issues for further exploration and
research.
1. The Irreducible Attributes of Personhood in Cyberspace
If privacy concerns the inviolability or integrity of persons, it
must protect those things essential to personhood. Virtualist privacy
thus targets those "irreducible attributes" of the virtual person in
cyberspace that relate to "individuality, dignity, and autonomy." 194 But
what are these attributes? Our discussion of three different conceptions
of the virtual person in cyberspace offers some insight. First, virtual
personhood is constituted by data and information. I mean this not only
in the obvious sense that virtual worlds and cyberspaces are products
of code and therefore must consist of bits of data, but also in the sense
that our virtual identities, activities, and personas are primarily shaped
and influenced not only by data we volunteer (such as data to create a
3D avatar) but also information gathered or available about our
activities, whether virtual commerce in Second Life or web browsing
on the Internet. This shapes not only our autonomy and behavior (and
freedom to act as we choose), but also the physical contours of our
travels in cyberspace. Architecture in cyberspace is fluid and shaped
by a two-way flow of information between the virtual traveler and the
destinations.
Second, the integrity of virtual personhood requires real space
and virtual space to remain disconnected and distinct. This divide is
maintained by the anonymity of cyberspace, which offers shelter to
allow people to learn, grow, transform identity, and find a new sense of
belonging in a virtual community sometimes radically different from
the one negotiated in their actual lives. Disclosure and other means of
linking virtual and real lives threaten such exploration, damaging either
real world or virtual world identity. Ideas like "virtual reputation[]"' 195
and the importance of membership in virtual communities (to many
virtual world citizens), both 3D and on the Internet, illustrate that
virtual personhood must occupy a distinct place, isolated from real
space identities, responsibilities and communities.
Third, virtual personhood involves more than just a "rational
mind" or a continuing consciousness negotiating cyberspace in the
Kantian and Lockean sense. There is an aspect of embodiment to
virtual persons. This is obvious in the case of the virtual person in a
complete virtual reality environment or the 3D avatar in a virtual
world. Here, there is an actual representation of the virtual body in
cyberspace. Yet, as I have argued, there is also an element of
embodiment in the 2D environs of the Internet. From a virtualist
194 in
195 Zarsky, supra note 36, at 246.
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perspective, the digital dossiers or profiles about us, and the
information and data collected about our activities (like web browsing)
that can be linked to our IP address, both intimate and otherwise,
embody or "make up" our virtual person in these cyberspaces,
governed and shaped by information and data. This data attaches to,
and constitutes, our virtual identity.
Once again, virtual persons should not be understood as
somehow cut off or disconnected from our actual selves in real space,
thus raising independent privacy interests. To the contrary, virtual
personhood is an extension or emanation inextricably linked to our
actual lives and identities, with real implications for our freedom,
intimacy and dignity. Virtualist privacy just offers the best way to
address these unique issues.
2. Toward a Theory of Virtualist Privacy
A theory of virtualist privacy should, at its foundation, protect
these attributes of virtual personhood. Not surprisingly, these attributes
also have implications for the types of legal and theoretical tools
necessary to properly protect privacy in cyberspace. Virtualist privacy
requires by logical necessity a form of informational privacy. If virtual
personhood is constituted by data and information at the most basic
and fundamental level, then protecting privacy of virtual persons will
require privacy in data and information. An important difference
between this reliance on a form of informational privacy and the
predominant idea of "information privacy" in privacy scholarship is
that the latter is often set out as a new "type" or "category" for the
concept of privacy to cover. Traditionally, the concept of privacy
covers things related to privacy of the person-autonomy, decisional
privacy, protection from government intrusion in our private and
intimate lives. Traditional privacy scholarship (probably unwittingly)
deploys an externalist perspective and thus must tack on
"informational privacy" as a new ground for the traditional concept to
cover.
Virtualist privacy avoids these complications. On a virtualist
perspective, the virtual person is constituted by information or data, so
privacy of the virtual person requires privacy in these constitutive
parts. The concept of privacy does not need to be transformed to
account for cyberspace; rather, it must simply be applied in its
traditional conceptual understanding within cyberspace, the realm of
virtual persons. Unlike the externalist perspective from real space
where informational privacy must be explained as somehow attaching
to information records and data, from a virtualist approach privacy
attaches to the virtual persona. It just so happens that the virtual person
is constituted by data and information in its various permutations and
forms: in complete virtual reality environments and virtual worlds, and
on the Internet.
So a virtualist approach to privacy in cyberspace requires
informational privacy. What sort of conceptual framework is necessary
to protect the irreducible attributes of virtual personhood? I recognize
that strong privacy protections for all of the personal information about
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us available online would go too far, and restrict the flow of
information. Often, we want some information about us to be offered
to sites (i.e. bits of data in cookies) to make our online travels more
convenient or easier to negotiate. But other more intimate personal
information could receive greater protection. There needs to be a
practical balance.
A virtualist approach might protect three primary spheres of
privacy relating to the virtual person. The first sphere offers strong
privacy protections for any personal information that would tend to
"link" the virtual person to the actual person in real space. This
includes most prominently identifiable personal information (IPI):
names, addresses, phone numbers, email, as well as information like
race, age, gender, employment, and credit history, which could reveal
identity if synthesized with other available personal information. For
example, virtualist privacy would advocate strong protection against
disclosure of information that would link a person's IP address, or
other digital identifier, to their actual home address or other IPI. Or in
another case, player data from a virtual world multiplayer game or
virtual community that consists of IPI would be protected from
disclosure to other virtual players, to protect identities and reputations.
One way to think about this sphere of virtualist privacy is in
terms of more traditional ideas about privacy-protection against
disclosure for IPI and other intimate information that reveals identity
would protect individuals from humiliation or loss of dignity if certain
virtual activities were linked to the person in real space. 196 This is
privacy of the individual against unreasonable or unjustified
intrusions. 197 Privacy protection is often framed on the basis of dignity
(as personhood has long been an important aspect of privacy), but
again, the problem with these traditional notions of privacy is that they
cannot account for informational privacy.
This sphere of protection also finds some rationale in the many
normative justifications for anonymity in cyberspace. These have been
convincingly advanced by others like Julie Cohen, 198 and I need not
repeat them here. Essentially, this sphere of protection relates to the
idea of virtual personhood, as informational links between real-space
identity and virtual persons can detrimentally impact reputation and
individual identity on both sides of the divide. The "threat" to privacy
along these lines is posed both by government and private actors. As
Tal Zarksky points out, governments often have the capacity to collect
personal information about us in cyberspace and link that information
to our identities in real space. 199 In some cases, disclosure of IPI can
obliterate virtual personas built on self-learning and reinvention. An
196 See LESSIG, supra note 30, at 147-48 (examining the possibility of protection
applied to the concept of privacy as dignity).
197 id
198 Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 U. CONN. L. REV. 981 (1991).
199 Zarksky, supra note 36, at 243-44.
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informational privacy regime that guaranteed protection from
disclosure of information that could easily link our identities would
attenuate these threats. This sphere of privacy protection applies to
ideas of the virtual person both in 3D virtual worlds and the 2D spaces
of the Internet.
The second and third spheres or areas of virtualist privacy
would cast the net of informational privacy wider still, focusing on
privacy attached to the virtual person, including the virtual body. The
focus here shifts to the preservation of the autonomy and decisional
liberty of the virtual person in cyberspace. The privacy laws and other
regulatory schemes normally discussed by privacy theorists offer
measures to protect and preserve the privacy and autonomy of the
person in real space-privacy protection for home, work, intimate
relationships, etc. Virtualist privacy would do the same thing, but
instead propose strict privacy practices in cyberspace, which focus on
and attach to the virtual person and their virtual activities. As already
noted, for many people their virtual persona is more central or integral
200to their sense of self than their physical lives in real space. If this is
the future direction of virtual life and cyberspace, then it is worthwhile
conceiving of people possessing distinct privacy rights and protections
both in their real space and virtual persons.20 1 This is what the
virtualist perspective demands.
The second sphere of virtualist privacy would require stricter
privacy practices to protect virtual persons against massive collection
and compiling of information about, or attached to, their online or
virtual activities (such as compiling of extensive player data). Such
privacy protections would help preserve the autonomy and liberty of
virtual persons in cyberspace. Information profiling and collection and
transmission of massive bits of data on virtual and online activities
creates what Sonia Katyal calls a "culture of panopticism" where
individuals discipline and normalize their behavior for fear of being
watched or monitored.2 °2 This has a subtle but profound impact on
conduct, even in the virtual and often anonymous environments of
cyberspace. In Daniel Solove's words: "By constantly living under the
reality that one could be observed at any time, people assimilate the
effects of surveillance into themselves. They obey not because they are
monitored but because of their fear that they could be watched. This
fear alone is sufficient to achieve control., 20 3 As in real space, people
living through virtual persons suppress behavior under the constant
threat of data monitoring and collection.
These concerns are also linked to virtualist privacy protection
for IPI. With greater amounts of information compiled and attaching to
a virtual person (like player data in a virtual world), there is a greater
possibility that more intimate information (like IPI) could be mixed
200 See Lastowka & Hunter, Virtual World, supra note 36, at 52 n.280.
201 But see Zarsky, supra note 36, at 251-52 (asserting that it is too soon to tell).
202 Katyal, supra note 51, at 300, 318.
203 Solove, supra note 59, at 1415.
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with more benign data, and thus could be disclosed, leading to
humiliation or "links" between real space and virtual identity. This
second sphere of virtualist privacy would thus require privacy practices
to regulate collection of information in virtual worlds, like player data,
so as to limit its scope and flow (particularly from private to public
hands). There is also a communitarian rationale underlying these
measures. Communitarian arguments are usually offered to oppose
privacy arguments.2 °4 But my concern here is virtual communities.
Without these important protections for virtual persons, which allow
for self-determination, unconventional expression and other virtual
activities, communities in virtual environments will suffer.2 °5
This third sphere of virtualist privacy offers more experimental
ideas about privacy in cyberspace. The focus is less on IPI or
information and data collection and compiling than on the specific
privacy interests of virtual persons living and engaging with others in
virtual worlds. Virtual persons have privacy interests in virtual space,
just as persons have similar interests in real space. Though novel, I
would argue that these ideas follow intuitively from certain
conceptions of the virtual person. As already noted, conceiving of
personhood in these 3D cyberspaces is easy because our bodies and
actions are represented in these virtualized environments in the same
way we understand our bodies in real space. The person acts as we do
in real space, making choices, moving, living, forming relations.
Applying concepts of privacy to these circumstances are natural; the
virtual person-represented in a three-dimensional world by an
avatar-should receive the same bodily and spatial privacy
considerations as our persons in real space. Personal space and
personal creations of virtual community members should be shielded
from view, subject to the same privacy protections as such intimate
areas of creativity and living in real space.
So, for example, one might suggest that a person's activities in
his virtual house in Second Life ought to be protected from the prying
eyes of other members of the virtual community and quite possibly
legal authorities. Indeed, the extent and application of privacy in
virtual worlds is presently a live issue for legal authorities and
governments. Just as legal disputes within virtual communities are
inevitable,20 6 so too are disputes about privacy protections for virtual
persons in 3D worlds. In April of 2007, it was reported that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation was invited by Linden Lab to investigate
allegations of (potentially illegal) virtual gambling being conducted in
204 See Cohen, supra note 76, at 1428-29 (discussing the argument that restrictions on
flow of information could harm community interest in public safety and health, by
preventing such information from being disclosed).
205 See id. at 1426; see also Thomas C. Anderson, The Body and Communities in
Cyberspace: A Marcellian Analysis, 2 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 153, 153-54 (2000)
(describing the freedoms of the virtual community).
206 See Phil Davis, Second Life Spawns Real World Law Suite, CHARLOTTE SUN-
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Second Life's virtual world.2 °7 Such circumstances raise issues of the
application of traditional privacy protections from government
searches and investigations, but with the complication of this being
virtual, not real, space. If illegal virtual activities are, nonetheless, done
in the sanctity of a Second Life user's home, should there be special
protection against intrusions into that home? Though virtual gambling
may violate anti-gambling statutes, lawyers should ask what sort of
legal obligations Linden Lab has to its users and what sort of
restrictions there should be on government investigations in virtual
spaces, given reasonable expectations of privacy against such
investigations in comparable real spaces. Of course, these points raise a
number of complex regulatory questions concerning the application of
laws to virtual worlds that go beyond the scope of this Article. My
point, however, is that ideas about privacy are certainly not alien to the
3D virtual worlds of cyberspace.
If privacy protects the "integrity of the personality, ', 208 or
person, then figuring out the "person" in cyberspace is necessary to
protecting integrity through privacy. While not offering an exhaustive
account, I have attempted to elaborate the "person" in cyberspace and
provide a starting framework for discussion about virtualist privacy.
Again, questions are raised: Why should privacy theorists even
consider the virtualist perspective? What are the benefits? Or is
virtualism just a conceptual slight of hand, with no impact on present
ideas about privacy and its justification? The next Part sets out to
answer these questions and others.
V. WHY VIRTUALIST PRIVACY?
The distinction between external and virtualist perspectives is
primarily an analytical tool. It helps us make sense of different
theoretical and normative problems concerning law and technology.
But it can transform our ways of thinking about these problems too,
illustrating new ways to approach older legal problems. I believe this is
the case with privacy in cyberspace. Virtualist privacy has three
advantages: (a) conceptual and normative; (b) constitutional; and (c)
technical/public policy.
A. NORMATIVE AND CONCEPTUAL ADVANTAGE
1. Simplifying the Concept of Privacy
A person negotiating cyberspace makes personal choices,
discloses intimate information, and engages in activities she or he
would prefer remained private. But as Lessig notes, data and
information collection is the "dominant activity of commercial
websites," with ninety-two percent collecting, sorting and compiling
207 See Adam Pasick, FBI Checks Gambling in Second Life Virtual World, REUTERS,
Aug. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSHUN43981820070404.
208 Solove, supra note 116, at 1116 (discussing the conception of privacy as related to
personhood).
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personal data from web users.2 °9 Oscar Gandy calls it the "panoptic
sort," with cyberspace constituting and incorporating a massive
structure for the collection of data and, with it, subtle and overt forms
of discrimination based on that data.210 This data compilation and the
privacy threat it poses reduces our liberty and freedom in
cyberspace. 2 11 For example, few people would conduct online searches
freely (particularly when searching for controversial material), if each
query were being logged to their profile or logfile linked to their
internet provider address.
Lack of informational privacy affects our autonomy and
decisionmaking in cyberspace in other ways. As discussed earlier,
information collected and made available about us in cyberspace often
plays an important role in setting boundaries on our autonomy, the
places we can go, things we can see; cookies, digital certificates and
other forms of digital authentication, our physical IP addresses, data
we provide to online sites that is then shared with others-these and
other bits of information shape our experience and travels in different
cyberspaces. We should be concerned about this "profiling" not only
because it can be easily linked to our identities in real space, causing
humiliation or loss of dignity, but for other reasons, too. As Lessig
points out, as the "system" watches, it forces people into patterns that
limit options and diversity of choice in cyberspace (it collects data
about you, generalizes your preferences, and feeds them back to you,
212creating a cycle). This also disrupts the diversity and cohesion of
online communities by creating "zones" of economic or personal
preference.213
These and other circumstances demonstrate the necessity of
privacy, and how traditional concern for autonomy and decisional
privacy-ideas linked to privacy and personhood-apply to
cyberspace as much as real space. But on present theoretical and
conceptual approaches, a new "type" of privacy, informational, is seen
as necessary to address these concerns in the new context of
cyberspace, adding an already over-stretched and overly categorized
concept. Hence, Solove describes the concept of privacy as in
209 LESSIG, supra note 7, at 219.
210 Id. (citing OsCAR GANCY, THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993)).
211 Privacy promotes liberty and freedom by allowing us to engage in
"unconventional" and "unpopular" activities. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455 (1980) (arguing that "privacy is ... essential
to democratic governance because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of
the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy"); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1665 (1999) (arguing that
privacy influences "the extent to which certain actions or expressions of identity
are encouraged or discouraged"); see also Daniel J. Solove, A Tale of Two
Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195,
1199 (2006).
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"disarray,' 214 something that appears to be about "everything" and
therefore about "nothing., 215 The emergence of cyberspace means that
privacy is now faced with an entirely new and unique context to
protect, and in many ways the concept is still running (or being
stretched) to catch up with these changes. For this reason, privacy
theorists have taken the simple but less imaginative route of
enumerating cyberspace-and the informational privacy it requires-
as a new "concern' that requires a new "type" of privacy
(informational). This means that privacy has been diced and divided up
even more. A good example of this is Jerry Kang's focus on three
"clusters" of privacy: physical or spatial, decisional, and
informational.216
A virtualist approach to privacy in cyberspace avoids these
added complications. If persons are conceived as virtual persons within
cyberspace then privacy can be linked back to other, more familiar
notions of privacy centered on personhood. There is no need to posit
an additional "type" of privacy relating to information. This is easily
seen, for example, with the virtual person in virtual 3D worlds. The
virtual person in these contexts is simply a culmination of
information-both data entered to create the 3D avatar, and data
relating to the present and past activities of the avatar. Similarly, the
virtual person as embodied information also links privacy to the
person. The "person" is, much like the 3D avatar, a culmination of data
and information beginning with the IP address and all bits of data
logged and relating to that address, be it online searches, surfing habits,
or information disclosed, collected, or dispersed. Some of this
information is intimate, some less so, but nonetheless it all constitutes
the "virtual person" from a virtualist perspective. In cyberspace we
become an informational profile and the information embodies our
person. Should not this virtual person, this "digital person" (in
Solove's terms) have similarly strong privacy protections as our
persons in real space?
Conferring privacy protections on virtual persons requires by
necessity privacy in information; virtual persons are constituted by
information and data. They are one and the same. Virtualist privacy, in
other words, simplifies our concept of privacy. It does not require
formulation of a new vocabulary to speak to privacy in digital or
virtual contexts. Rather, we theorize persons in cyberspace and
contextualize privacy, rather than re-categorizing it endlessly.
2. Justifying Privacy in Data and Information
A central challenge for those hoping to strengthen privacy in
information and data-things that constitute and shape our experience
and activities in cyberspace-is to offer a compelling normative
justification for this "new" (or newer) "type" of privacy. This is not
214 Solove, supra note 61, at 477.
215 Id. at 479.
216 Kang, supra note 47, at 1202-03; see also Lin, supra note 46, at 1093.
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only a philosophical, legal, or ethical concern. It is a public policy one,
too. Raising public awareness about threats to privacy on the Internet
and other electronic networks and promoting what Paul Schwartz calls
"privacy norms for information ' 217 are essential to meet the challenges
technology and cyberspace pose to the privacy, liberty and autonomy
of citizens. 2 18 But to get there, a normative justification or foundation
for informational privacy is necessary. This passage from Lessig's
Code 2.0 illustrates this reflexive need:
But (at least some kinds of) information about
individuals should be treated differently .... Individuals
should be able to control information about themselves.
We should be eager to help them protect that
information by giving them the structures and the rights
to do so. We value, or want, our peace. And thus, a
regime that allows us such peace by giving us control
over private information is a regime consonant with
public values. It is a regime that public authorities
should support.219
Notice Lessig's language. We "should" protect information. We
"value" privacy. Public authorities "should" support a regime that
protects informational privacy. But again, this returns to the question-
what is the normative and conceptual basis for informational privacy?
The predominant approach has been to link informational privacy to
property interests. But this has failed for a number of reasons
(discussed earlier in Part I1), not the least of which is that in
cyberspace the technologies that threaten privacy are often themselves
advanced with recourse to property rights and interests, reducing
privacy to a low-level interest often outweighed by more powerful
220property interests and stakeholders.
Informational and data privacy needs a stronger foundation.
Julie Cohen has recognized this. She writes that informational privacy
interests are more fundamental than the present property-based
regime. 22 1 But she admits the move from fundamental ideas like
human dignity to information privacy is a "leap., 222 On first take,
Cohen seems right. How can electronic records, data, and other bits of
information be connected to people? But it only seems like a normative
gap from an externalist perspective. If people are understood as
external from cyberspace and cut off from the information and data
that constitutes their persons and identities in these contexts, then yes,
connecting those external and remote bits of information to more
217 Schwartz, supra note 56, at 858.
218 See id at 858-60.
219 LESSIG, supra note 7, at 231.
220 See my discussion of piracy surveillance, supra Part 111.
221 Cohen, supra note 76, at 1423.
222 Id at 1424.
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fundamental ideas like human dignity and privacy of the person
requires a great normative leap.
A virtualist approach to privacy in cyberspace avoids this
normative gap. From an externalist or realist perspective, a person
negotiating cyberspace and virtual worlds is simply a person sitting at
his computer. The information the person posts to an online
community board, or uses to form their 3D avatar for Second Life or
volunteers during his online travels is simply information that is "out
there" in cyberspace connected to the person only insofar as the
information is a representation about the person. A virtualist
perspective transforms our thinking on these points. It holds that in
order to understand privacy in cyberspace, we must first conceive the
virtual person in cyberspace, and build a framework for privacy
protection based on that foundation; this makes sense because
personhood has traditionally played a central role in justifying theories,
laws and other measures aiming to protect privacy.
I discussed three notions of the person in cyberspace: (1) the
virtual person in complete virtual reality environments; (2) the virtual
person in 3D virtual worlds; and (3) the virtual person as embodied
information. Each of these notions of personhood offered different
challenges for a privacy regime, but most importantly, each
reconnected the person to ideas of informational privacy. From an
externalist perspective, the 3D avatar that negotiates virtual worlds is
simply a creation of data and information entered by the user external
to the virtual world. There is no privacy protection in that information,
or for anything the avatar does. Likewise, for the web surfer,
information gathered from online e-commerce and other activities is
also cut off from the individual and his or her privacy protections.
However, a virtualist approach to privacy understands the person
within cyberspace, such that each of these ideas of virtual persons
ought to receive privacy protections, just as our physical persons have
traditionally received privacy protections in real space.
Virtualism bridges the divide between privacy and the person
in cyberspace. In cyberspace, the virtual person is constituted by data
and information. If privacy is to be afforded to people from a virtualist
perspective, then informational privacy is required by necessity. What
would, on the externalist view, be simply a digital record of
information collected about the person's avatar or profile in
cyberspace, is the person in cyberspace on a virtualist approach.
The virtualist approach reconnects informational privacy to
personhood, by recognizing that in cyberspace, people take on
virtualized form and identity, synthesized and constituted by bits of
data and digital information. Similarly, it is much easier to justify
privacy protections in our "digital dossier,, 223 that is, in the
information that makes up our online persona, if we understand
ourselves as virtual persons in cyberspace constituted by that data and
information-if the law defines us as, in Solove's terms, a "digital
person."
223 SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 1-2.
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I am not a reductionist who believes privacy can be reduced to
one simple idea or unified with one definition. But there is a reason
why Rubenfeld described personhood as the "reigning explanatory
concept" on privacy.224 Personhood provides a strong conceptual and
normative framework for privacy. But informational privacy was set
outside that framework, leaving Cohen and others searching for
"fundamental values" to justify it. If privacy protects the "integrity" of
the person225 and a virtualist perspective reconnects this idea to privacy
in cyberspace, then Cohen's search, if not over, is at least much more
focused and narrowed.
B. VIRTUALIST PRIVACY AND THE CONSTITUTION
1. Against Whalen v Roe: Breathing Life into a Constitutional Right to
Cyberspace Privacy
Earlier, I noted that most privacy scholars have little hope for
the recognition of a constitutional right most important to privacy in
cyberspace, "informational privacy." Few believe the U.S. Supreme
Court will ever expand its passing reference to the idea in Whalen v.
Roe.226 Jurisprudence has drawn a "firm line" between "substantive"
ideas of privacy relating to issues affecting personhood and
informational ones, 227 the former having constitutional protection
while the latter not.228 In fact, I argued that it was this distinction in
Whalen v. Roe, between informational privacy and the more traditional
idea of privacy linked to personhood (i.e. the importance of autonomy
and decisionmaking), that has made the recognition of a right to
informational privacy unlikely. Much like the predominant conceptual
approach to informational privacy, the Court set off privacy in personal
information from an entrenched body of constitutional jurisprudence
linking privacy to personhood.
After Whalen v. Roe two conceptual and jurisprudential lines
were formed. On one side were famous privacy cases that tied privacy
to personhood like Griswold v. Connecticu12 2 9 and Roe v. Wade.2 30 In
both of those cases, privacy was related to ideas about the autonomy,
dignity, and decisionmaking of the person, and the need to preserve
that space for the person to make fundamental life decisions,
particularly about the body (Roe v. Wade), without intrusion from
government or otherwise. On the other side was the novel idea of
privacy in information (enforced by non-disclosure), something the
Court had "not previously defined.",23' The Court thus disconnected
224 Rubenfeld, supra note 72, at 739.
225 Solove, supra note 116, at 1116.
226 See, e.g, Lin, supra note 46, at 1089.
227 Katyal, supra note 51, at 239; Katyal, supra note 53, at 308.
228 Katyal, supra note 51, at 240-1; Katyal, supra note 53, at 308.
229 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
230 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
231 SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 65.
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privacy in information about us from the central theme of privacy and
personhood-privacy in the body and the person. This made it much
less likely for a constitutional right to privacy to be later recognized
(because it set informational privacy apart from traditional
jurisprudence) and also created a conceptual chasm between
personhood and informational privacy yet to be bridged.
Not only does the shift to a virtualist perspective bridge the
aforementioned normative and conceptual divide, but it also opens the
door to the possibility of constitutional recognition. By offering a
normative and conceptual means to reconnect privacy in cyberspace
(and informational privacy) to personhood, contra Whalen v. Roe, we
also reconnect informational privacy to more traditional privacy
jurisprudence centered on personhood. As noted by Solove, the U.S.
Supreme Court has offered a "personhood theory of privacy" in many
232
of its substantive due process decisions centered on privacy. In fact,
in 1891 the Court was already linking ideas of privacy to the person, as
apparent in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,233 which
proclaimed "the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. 234
Following these ideas of personhood and the "zones" of
"personal, marital, familial, and sexual" privacy in Griswold and "the
right of personal privacy" in Roe v. Wade, the Court clearly set out its
theory in Planned Parenthood v. Casey235 where, once again, laws
controlling abortion were challenged. For the majority, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education . . . . These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.236
232 Solove, supra note 116, at 1117 ("The Supreme Court has espoused a personhood
theory of privacy in its substantive due process decisions such as Griswold v.
Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, and others.").
233 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
234 Solove, supra note 116, at 1117 (citing Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251).
235 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
236 Id. at 851.
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This theory of privacy and personhood finds expression in a rich body
of constitutional jurisprudence that relates privacy to concerns centered
on the person: personal autonomy, intimacy, and decisionmaking,
particularly over deeply personal things like our bodies and personal
health. Yet none of these ideas have been used by the Court to expand
upon the passing reference to informational privacy in Whalen v. Roe.
The reason, I have argued, is that the court improperly set
informational privacy apart from personhood. But a virtualist approach
anchors privacy to the virtual person, reconnecting concerns of
personal autonomy, decisionmaking, and privacy in the context of
cyberspace.
In arguing for the recognition of a constitutional right to
privacy in information and data tied to individuals in cyberspace,
privacy theorists no longer need to rely on unusual ideas of property
interests in information, but can, instead, invoke the more common
idea of privacy in the person; the only difference is that the persons
discussed are virtualpersons. Privacy follows naturally here-it is tied
to our persons, bodies, and identities and, in Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's terms, the decisions we make to define our "concept of
existence" in the universe. The only difference here is that the universe
is not real space, but cyberspace. The idea that persons in virtual
contexts receive privacy protections is not alien to the American
constitutional tradition, but an important part of it. As Julie Cohen
writes: "A realm of autonomous, unmonitored choice, in turn,
promotes a vital diversity of speech and behavior. The recognition that
anonymity shelters constitutionally-protected decisions about speech,
belief, and political and intellectual association - decisions that
otherwise might be chilled by unpopularity or simple difference - is
part of our constitutional tradition., 237 Though some legal
commentators will likely remain skeptical about courts finally
articulating such a constitutional commitment, the best path to that
goal is not in the conceptual divide of Whalen v. Roe, but in the
normative framework of virtualist privacy. Virtualist privacy
illuminates a creative new path toward a broad constitutional right to
privacy, which incorporates informational privacy, in cyberspace.
2. Contextualism, not Translation
My argument that privacy theorists should adopt the virtualist
perspective in order to justify arguments for the recognition of a
constitutional right to informational privacy (necessary for privacy in
cyberspace) includes the corollary proposition that theorists should
spend less time thinking about the concept of privacy and offering
detailed accounts of its constituent parts. Instead, privacy theorists
should think more clearly about the subjects of privacy, being people,
and how people ought to be understood in the context of cyberspace.
These ideas also set out a way of approaching constitutional ideas and
concepts in the context of cyberspace. Against Professor Lessig, I
237 Cohen, supra note 76, at 1425.
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believe the key to bringing constitutional values to digital contexts is
not translation, 238 but what I call "contextualism."
Virtual and digital technologies are constantly developing and
advancing and pose a sustained challenge to legal regimes, particularly
constitutions that portend to constrain the conduct of governments and
citizens. 239 How can the Constitution preserve liberty and other
constitutional values if the context of society and technology changes
so rapidly that constitutional constraints are rendered ineffective?
Lessig proposes a strategy of what he calls "translation" in order to
address this challenge. Translation determines the "original meaning"
of a constitutional provision and offers a reading that best preserves
that meaning "in the present context," the context being cyberspace.240
So, with respect to the Fourth Amendment, which originally conceived
applied to trespass, Lessig argues that the meaning of the
Amendment-to curtail technologies of privacy invasion-means that
it should similarly apply to wiretapping and other invasive
technologies of today's world. 241 This "translates" the constitutional
values originally underlying the Fourth Amendment into the context of
modern times. 242 On one level, my proposals for adopting a virtualist
approach to privacy in cyberspace draws on Lessig's idea of
translation. I argue that privacy in cyberspace, which requires
informational privacy, can be grounded in traditional constitutional
values of privacy based on personhood. I have translated privacy to the
context of cyberspace.
But this is not entirely true. Lessig's metaphor of "translation"
does not capture the nature of my approach. I am not arguing that
privacy be translated or transformed. The term "translation" implies
saying the same thing but in a different language. Instead, I am arguing
that privacy not be transformed or translated, just moved and theorized
in a different context; there is no translation to a different language, but
simply repetition (privacy is good) in a different context (cyberspace).
I call this contextualism, rather than translation. The problem with
present approaches to privacy in cyberspace is that theorists have failed
to take into account the virtualist perspective and how people (not
necessarily constitutional values) ought to be understood in the context
of cyberspace. The central challenge is not to translate constitutional
values of privacy, but simply to understand how privacy, traditionally
238 Lessig, supra note 42, at 873 (arguing that translation is "central to cyberspace's
survival as a place where values of individual liberty are sustained"); see also
LESSIG, supra note 7, at 160.
239 See Lessig, supra note 42, at 870. Lessig calls this a "codifying"
constitutionalism.
-0 LESSIG, supra note 7, at 160 (noting that translation "aims at finding a current
reading of the original Constitution that preserves its original meaning in the
present context").
-1 LESSIG, supra note 7, at 160-61 (discussing Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion
about the application of the Fourth Amendment to modern technologies).
242 Id at 161.
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understood, works in the context of cyberspace. This is a subtle, but
important difference.
This might place too much emphasis on Lessig's metaphor of
"translation." I agree with Lessig's central point, that constitutional
provisions ought to be read differently (from, say, their original text) in
order to preserve their original purpose of protecting things like liberty
or privacy in new contexts. After all, the most likely way a
constitutional right to informational privacy will be recognized-even
if a court adopts my argument for a virtualist perspective-is through
some interpretive strategy like Lessig's theory of translation. There is
no provision in the U.S. Constitution providing for informational
privacy; rather, the idea must develop out of the "zone of privacy"
apparent in the "penumbras" of the Constitution noted in Griswold v.
Connecticut and Roe v. Wade. But contextual constitutional
interpretation seems more achievable than the more transformative
idea of translating constitutional values.
C. VIRTUALIST PRIVACY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CODE
A virtualist approach to privacy in cyberspace offers a new
conceptual framework for thinking about legal and technological
problems that affect privacy, and also lays the groundwork for greater
constitutional recognition for privacy in informational and cyberspace
contexts. But there are further benefits relating to public policy,
government, and private action on privacy, as well as shaping the
future of cyberspace code; these points need elaboration.
1. The State Action Dilemma: Why Constitutional Recognition Still
Matters
Critics will point out that a constitutional right to informational
privacy, even if recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, will not solve
privacy concerns in cyberspace. Sure, governments, and their great
capacity to collect, store, and distribute information about citizens,
243
remain an important, perhaps even central threat to privacy. But in
many environments of cyberspace, threats to privacy are posed by
private entities, not state actors, to which the Constitution would not
apply.244 Of course, a constitutional right will not solve all privacy
problems. But that does not mean it would not constitute a key step in
the fight for greater privacy protections. I do not intend to rehash all
the arguments usually offered as to why a constitutional right to
243 U.S. federal agencies and departments maintain nearly 2000 databases with
records relating to immigration, financial history, welfare, licensing, and many
other matters, with records often flowing between the private and public sector.
See SOLOVE, supra note 50, at 15.
244 Katyal, supra note 51, at 381 ("[U]nder the state action doctrine, constitutional
guarantees can limit the activities of a private party if the conduct in question is
entwined with traditional state functions."); see also Berman, supra note 7, at 1266
("[T]he state action doctrine, in its least nuanced form, rests on the observation
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informational privacy would be a good thing. This has been done
245before, in a clear and convincing way. Instead, I would like to focus
on reasons why a constitutional commitment can have a positive
impact on privacy concerns created by non-state action. These reasons
have received less attention in scholarship.246 Drawing on what
Frederick Schauer calls "First Amendment culture" in the United
247States, a constitutional commitment to privacy, particularly
informational privacy in cyberspace, can have a positive impact on
privacy concerns beyond its legal enforcement and application to state
action.
Each country, writes Schauer, has a "showstopper" for a
constitutional or political argument, one that receives more attention,
248respect and, when deployed, often more success than any other. In
the United States that argument happens to be free speech via the First
249Amendment. Yet this "free speech" culture cannot be explained by
looking to cultural preferences alone, nor, on the other hand, by simply
examining the First Amendment and its history of legal and
constitutional enforcement. Rather, the value of free speech in America
is linked to a deep constitutional and cultural commitment; it is a
product of a constitutional culture of free speech. Hence, Schauer calls
it "First Amendment culture. 25 °  The Founding Generation's
commitment to free speech apparent in the First Amendment, and the
provision's subsequent enforcement in various high profile cases over
the years, has helped foster a constitutional culture in broader
American society that promotes and preserves free speech and the free
movement of ideas.25'
There is no similar constitutional culture for privacy, let alone
data or informational privacy. This has had at least two detrimental
effects on privacy protections. First, privacy often conflicts with the
245 See Lin, supra note 46, at 1107-18 (discussing the "failure of non-constitutional
law" such as tort and statute law in protecting people's privacy, and arguing that a
constitutional right would avoid these problems because it is "permanent" and
"inalienable" and would promote privacy protecting measures).
246 But see generally Berman, supra note 7. Elbert Lin, supra note 46, also makes
passing reference to the idea. Id at 1122-23.
247 Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV.
L. REv. 84, 111 (1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles]; see also Frederick
Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH
IN THE MODERN ERA 197 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism].
248 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 247, at 176.
249 See id
250 Schauer, Principles, supra note 247 at 111; see also Schauer, First Amendment
Opportunism, supra note 247, at 176.
251 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1149, 1169-70 (2005) (discussing the "importance of the First
Amendment to American legal and political culture," including the "large number"
of First Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court alone over the years, as
well as the "voluminous bulk" of First Amendment scholarship).
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broad protections and cultural respect accorded to freedom of speech
and information. Data and informational privacy regimes or theories
that would restrict the flow of data and information often face fierce
opposition from speech advocates, usually in the form of the supposed
"First Amendment critique.'252 And, in fact, when privacy has
conflicted with the First Amendment in the past, the latter has
invariably won out.253 Privacy remains at the mercy of First
Amendment culture. Second, without a constitutional commitment to
informational privacy, there is less general awareness in the broader
public about threats to privacy in cyberspace. This means
governments, and thus actors in the private sector, have easily ducked
their responsibility to ensure privacy is protected in the public interest.
Fortunately, a virtualist approach to privacy opens the door to a
constitutional right to informational and data privacy. By reconnecting
the ideas of informational privacy to traditional constitutional
jurisprudence centered on theories of personhood, the possibility of a
broader constitutional commitment to privacy being recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court is that much greater. Such constitutional
recognition has benefits beyond the obvious one of limiting
government intrusion and overreaching on personal data and
information in cyberspace. Paul Schiff Berman argues that
constitutional adjudication has important social, political, and cultural
benefits outside mere dispute resolution. Adjudication of a
constitutional interest in informational and data privacy allows courts
to perform an "educative function" by articulating national values and
stimulates broader social deliberation of public interest issues like
254privacy. The narratives constructed and promoted by the processes
of the law and Constitution contribute and shape social knowledge.255
In advocating a broader constitutional discourse on privacy,
Berman's target is the state-action doctrine. The boundaries set by the
doctrine prevent the Constitution from applying to private actors and
the threats to privacy they pose on the Internet and in other
cyberspaces. But Berman does explain how courts might, at the outset,
anchor a broader constitutional right to privacy in the Constitution.
Courts might agree that constitutional discourse is beneficial, but it
needs the tools the get there. The virtualist approach to privacy, if
252 For a discussion and critique of the First Amendment critique see id. at 1154-65.
See also Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 976-981 (2003).
253 Richards, supra note 251, at 1155 ("[W]hen the First Amendment and privacy
have come into conflict in the past . . . the First Amendment has universally
triumphed.").
254 Berman, supra note 7, at 1269 (writing that adjudication can allow courts to
"perform an educative function by articulating values and constructing narratives"
that help construct "national identity" while creating "opportunities for courts to
operate as deliberative fora in which difficult political issues are addressed").
255 Id. at 1292 (arguing that the judicial process can also help construct important
social narratives by first "enacting a performance in which the society 'creates,
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adopted, offers hope for such constitutional recognition to get where
Berman wants to go.
Second, a constitutional commitment to privacy in cyberspace,
that is, informational (and data) privacy, imposes greater social and
political pressure on governments to take steps-legislative or
otherwise-to protect privacy. Paul Schwartz is right to say that
privacy "rhetoric" often neglects the positive role the State can and
should play in preserving privacy.256 He suggests that governments can
advance privacy-enhancing norms, by offering incentives to private
and commercial actors for improving privacy protections and
promoting a "bandwagon effect., 257 That is, if the State takes a
leadership role in protecting the privacy of government data, the
general public and non-state actors are likely to follow suit with
interest and support.258  Though constitutional recognition is
unnecessary for such State initiative, each of these things could help
foster a "constitutional culture" of informational privacy, leading to
greater cultural awareness and legal significance for privacy claims
about cyberspace.
3. Coding the Virtualist Perspective
A constitutional commitment to privacy can also influence
those who may be the most important players in the future of
cyberspace privacy-not corporations or governments, but the next
generation of programmers who will play a central role in shaping and
developing the next layers of the "code" of cyberspace in coming
years. Lawrence Lessig famously illustrated the importance of
computer code to the future of the Internet and cyberspace. Values like
liberty and privacy are not intrinsic to cyberspace; rather, they were
hard-wired into the architecture of cyberspace at its founding and early
development.259 The first generation of programmers was deeply
influenced by free speech and the First Amendment culture of the
United States. As Lessig observes, TCP/IP protocol essentially codifies
the First Amendment into the "architecture of cyberspace., 260 But code
is not fixed. The future includes a battle over the types of values to be
embedded in the additional layers of code that will govern the direction
of cyberspace.
Julie Cohen raises these issues when she discusses
"informational privacy by design." 261 The architecture of cyberspace is
"chosen" and while "privacy considerations" have not been a top
256 Schwartz, supra note 56, at 816.
257 Id at 856.
258 Id at 856-57.
259 See Lawrence Lessig, Code is Law: On Liberty and Cyberspace, HARV. MAG.
(Jan.-Feb. 2000), available at http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-
line/0100121.html.
260 Id at 2.
261 Cohen, supra note 76, at 1436.
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priority so far, this can change.262 Law cannot solve these problems,
but it can work to "establish a new set of institutional parameters that
supply incentives for the design of privacy-enhancing technologies to
flourish. Legal protection alone cannot create or guarantee
informational privacy. But it is a place to begin. , 263 A constitutional
commitment to privacy provides a strong normative foundation to
promote privacy-enhancing measures and, in addition, influences the
next generation of programmers, the same way the First Amendment
influenced the openness of cyberspace code today. The broader
advantages and positive implications of a constitutional commitment
are felt in those many spaces and forums of living beyond courtrooms
and government offices.264
But even if a clear constitutional commitment to informational
and cyberspace privacy is never recognized or achieved, virtualist
privacy still has positive benefits in this area because it is forward-
looking and speaks to people's experience in virtual environments and
cyberspace. Virtual living will become more and more familiar to the
next generations of young people, many who will make their way into
the field of information technology. The next generation of cyberspace
citizens (or netizens) will be raised with greater exposure to technology
and cyberspace than any before it and virtualist privacy will speak to
their experiences. More than those before, they will understand that for
important values like liberty and privacy to find expression in the
future structures of cyberspace, software and code must be approached
from the virtualist perspective, to take into account the concerns of
virtual persons and their interests in liberty and privacy.
VI. MOVING FORWARD: VIRTUALIST PRIVACY IN AMERICAAND
ABROAD
The growing body of second generation cyberlaw scholarship,
which I have dubbed the New Virtualism, speaks not only to the
differential character of cyberspace, but also draws connections
between real space and virtual space. This Article is situated within
this body of scholarship, offering a new approach to privacy in
cyberspace by drawing on the internalist or virtualist perspective.
Some, like Tal Zarsky, doubt the utility of examining privacy
rights from a virtualist perspective. He writes that it is "too early" to
theorize about independent or distinct privacy rights for virtual persons
and identities.265 I disagree. As Zarksky himself notes, there are many
262 Id.
263 Id at 1438.
264 See David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data
Protection, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 831, 852-53 (1991) ("[T]he purpose of
creating a constitutional right to privacy is not to leave data protection solely to the
courts, except for the interpretation of the necessary statutes in cases of conflict but
to allow individuals to assert privacy claims in various arenas that extend beyond
general and specific data protection laws.").
265 Zarsky, supra note 36, at 251 (writing that it is "still too early" to decide whether
"virtual personas" should be understood as "extensions" of the self).
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people whose online personas are more central to their sense of self
than their physical lives in real space. If virtual activities and
community are moving in this direction, we ought to be forward-
thinking in our approaches to legal and theoretical problems
concerning cyberspace, particularly with something as important to the
public interest as privacy.
Beyond outlining the origins of the New Virtualism, the
primary purpose of this Article has been to shift the predominant focus
of most work on privacy in cyberspace away from the concept of
privacy itself, to the subjects of privacy, that being persons and how
they should be conceived and understood in cyberspace. Privacy
theorists need to stop dicing up and over-theorizing privacy and instead
think more about the experience of people in cyberspaces, and how
privacy ought to work in that context. The virtualist approach to
privacy set out here attempts to do this. There may be other approaches
that do a better job. My purpose was not to set out an exhaustive
account of virtualist privacy, only to offer a beginning framework
which, as I have attempted to show, has many benefits. Others might
expand on my account, or advance alternatives.
Another future direction for virtualist privacy might include
comparative scholarship. Privacy threats in cyberspace are not
confined to the United States. Many countries are dealing with
domestic concerns about privacy in data and information.266 Since the
primary innovation of virtu alist privacy is not necessarily the definition
of privacy within a unique constitutional or legal culture but
understanding how people, the subjects of privacy, are understood in
different cyberspace contexts, virtualist privacy could be incorporated
into other legal and constitutional regimes. For example, constitutional
protections for privacy in Canada under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms267 draw on legal norms and concepts apparent in American
jurisprudence, like reasonable expectations of privacy.268 In fact, the
Canadian Charter itself speaks to "security of the person;" 269 and this
270
concept has formed the basis of some forms of privacy protections.
Does section 7 extend to security of virtualpersons, that is, to provide
additional privacy protections for people as they traverse the virtual
worlds of cyberspace? The "living tree" approach to constitutional
266 See id. at 13 (writing about proposals and solutions to resolve problems of
information privacy in other countries).
267 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982, ch.
11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Charter].
268 See Flaherty, supra note 264, at 844-47 (noting that in interpreting section of the
Charter of Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the American concept of
"reasonable expectation of privacy" set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
269 Charter, supra note 267, § 7 (encoding the right to not be deprived of "life, liberty
and security of the person.., except in accordance with principles of fundamental
justice").
270 Richard B. Bruyer, Privacy: A Review and Critique of the Literature, 43 ALTA. L.
REv. 553, 579 (2006); see also Flaherty, supra note 264, at 844-45.
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interpretation in Canada perhaps offers a greater likelihood than the
United States for recognition of virtualist privacy and the need for
informational privacy in cyberspace.
The externalist/virtualist distinction can be a powerful
analytical tool that can and should be used in other contexts. I have
used it here to incorporate a "virtualist perspective" on privacy in order
to re-frame debates on privacy and perhaps offer a new way forward
on these issues. Privacy is under threat.271 We need to change our
thinking sooner rather than later. We must go on.
271 Solove, supra note 116, at 1089 ("The widespread discontent over conceptualizing
privacy persists even though the concern over privacy has escalated into an
essential issue for freedom and democracy.").
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